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CHOKING THE CHANNEL OF PUBLIC INFORMATION:
RE-EXAMINATION OF AN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
WARNING ABOUT COPYRIGHT AND FREE SPEECH
EDWARD L. CARTER *

The U.S. Supreme Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft gave First Amendment importance
to the topic of copyright history. In measuring whether Congress has altered the
“traditional contours” of copyright such that First Amendment scrutiny must be
applied, federal courts—including the Supreme Court in its 2011 Term case
Golan v. Holder—must carefully examine the intertwined history of copyright and
freedom of the press. The famous but misunderstood case of Donaldson v. Beckett
in the British House of Lords in 1774 is an important piece of this history. In
Donaldson, several lawyers, litigants, judges, and lords recognized the danger
posed by copyright to untrammeled public communication. Eighteenth-century
newspaper accounts shed new light on the free press implications of this
important period in copyright law history.

INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................................80
I. SCHOLARLY VIEWS ON DONALDSON V. BECKETT .......................................84
II. ALEXANDER DONALDSON AND THE CRUSADE AGAINST SPEECH
MONOPOLY ................................................................................................91
III. DONALDSON V. BECKETT RE-EXAMINED ....................................................97
A. Day 1: Friday, February 4, 1774 ...................................................99
B. Day 2: Monday, February 7, 1774 ..............................................103
C. Day 3: Tuesday, February 8, 1774 ..............................................106
D. Day 4: Wednesday, February 9, 1774 .........................................106
E. Days 5, 6 and 7: Tuesday, February 15, 1774; Thursday, February
17, 1774; and Monday, February 21, 1774 .................................109
1. Was there a common law copyright? ......................................110
2. Was the common law copyright lost upon publication? .........111
3. Did the Statute of Anne supersede the common law copyright?
.................................................................................................112
4. Was there a perpetual common law copyright that authors
could assign to printers? .........................................................114

*

J.D. LL.M., Associate Professor of Communications, Brigham Young University, 360
BRMB, Provo, UT 84602, Tel. 801-422-4340, ed_carter@byu.edu.
79

80

N.Y.U. JOURNAL OF INTELL. PROP. & ENT. LAW

[Vol. 1:79

5. Did the Statute of Anne supersede the perpetual and assignable
common law copyright? ..........................................................114
F. Day 8: Tuesday, February 22, 1774 ............................................116
CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................................119
APPENDIX—SUMMARY OF DATA FROM WESTLAW “JOURNALS AND LAW REVIEWS”
DATABASE ON DONALDSON V. BECKETT ..................................................................125
INTRODUCTION
On Tuesday, February 22, 1774, Lord Effingham Howard rose in the British
House of Lords to declare that a perpetual common law copyright “might prove
dangerous to the constitutional rights of the people” 1 because it could amount to
government-sanctioned private censorship of communication.
The press,
Effingham said, was the lone check on official abuse of power, but a despotic
leader from government or monarchy could use copyright law to thwart freedom of
the press and hide his own wrongdoing. By purchasing the copyright in a work
critical of himself and then preventing reproduction and distribution, the despot
would be “securing in his closet the secret which might prevent the loss of
freedom” and “choking the channel of public information.” 2 Effingham concluded
by “declaring...that the Liberty of the Press was of such infinite consequence in
this country, that if the constitution was overturned, and the people were enslaved,
grant him but a free press and he would undertake to restore the one and redeem
the other.” 3
Effingham’s remarks came at the conclusion of the final day of a nearly
three-week legal appeal pitting hidebound London booksellers against an
innovative Scottish newspaper owner and bookseller named Alexander Donaldson.
Effingham told his fellow lords—sitting as Britain’s highest judicial authority to
decide the famous but misunderstood copyright case of Donaldson v. Beckett 4—
1

Literary Property, MORNING CHRON. & LONDON ADVERTISER, Feb. 26, 1774, at 2. Spelling
here and throughout this manuscript has been modernized.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
The case is reported in multiple eighteenth-century sources, but not all of them are equally
accurate and detailed. The authoritative legal reporter Sir James Burrow appended his report of
Donaldson v. Beckett to an earlier case, Millar v. Taylor, decided on the same issue by the Court
of King’s Bench in 1769. Burrow’s version tracks the minute book of the House of Lords. See
MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 108-09 (1993). However,
it lacks reporting of the speeches by the lords themselves and also contains a critical error in
reporting the recommendations of the common law judges. See Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng.
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that he opposed the perpetual common law copyright sought by the London
booksellers because the right would negatively “affect the Liberty of the Press.” 5
In a defining and enduring precedent that retains relevance today in both the
United Kingdom and the United States, Effingham and the majority of the other
lords rejected the booksellers’ arguments and concluded that neither an author nor
a printer could exercise copyright control of a creative work through a common
law copyright after the statutory period of copyright had ended. The House of
Lords reversed an injunction that had barred Donaldson from printing and selling
copies of James Thomson’s The Seasons without compensating the London
booksellers who had claimed to own the perpetual copyright.
Notwithstanding its expansiveness and eloquence, Effingham’s statement
has received relatively little attention from scholars and jurists. This fact can be
attributed in part to the idiosyncrasies of British case law reporting in the
eighteenth century: the two most prominent reported versions of Donaldson v.
Beckett do not even contain the speeches of Effingham or his fellow lords,
confining themselves instead to speeches by lawyers arguing the case and

Rep. 201 (K.B.). (Burrow’s report of Donaldson v. Beckett begins on page 257. For the sake of
accuracy, even when making a full citation to Burrow’s Donaldson alone, this article’s footnotes
will cite “Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 257 (K.B.),” because that is where the
report is located, and where it will be most easily found in electronic databases, even though the
case was decided in the House of Lords in 1774.) Meanwhile, the version reported by Brown
does not make the same error in counting the common law judges’ advisory opinions but, like
Burrow, omits the lords’ speeches. See Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L.). The
Parliamentary History version (or Hansard) is more comprehensive than either Burrow or Brown
because it contains concise summaries of the speeches by the lawyers, judges, and lords. See 17
Parl. Hist. Eng. (1774) 953. A version called here the “Anonymous Report” contains detailed
first-person accounts of the speeches by the lawyers, judges, and lords. See THE PLEADINGS OF
THE COUNSEL BEFORE THE HOUSE OF LORDS, IN THE GREAT CAUSE CONCERNING LITERARY
PROPERTY (London, Wilkin, 1774) [hereinafter Anonymous Report]. The so-called Gentleman’s
Report appears to be the most complete version of all five legal reports of the case. It includes a
report of written submissions by the parties to the House of Lords that is not included in the other
accounts. See THE CASES OF THE APPELLANTS AND RESPONDENTS IN THE CAUSE OF LITERARY
PROPERTY (London, Bew 1774) [hereinafter Gentleman’s Report]. This article also gleans
previously underappreciated details about Donaldson from eighteenth-century London and
Edinburgh newspaper accounts found in the National Library of Scotland in Edinburgh, the
British Library in London (Colindale), and the Burney Collection of Newspapers. The Reverend
Charles Burney (1757-1817) amassed a large collection of early British newspapers, now housed
at the British Library and made available electronically by Gale. The Burney Collection of
Newspapers, which was digitized and made searchable in 2007, contains more than 1,200 titles
and nearly one million pages.
5
Literary Property, supra note 1.
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comments by common law judges who were invited to advise the lords in making
the ultimate decision.6
However, in its treatment of two recent cases decided more than two
centuries after Donaldson, the U.S. Supreme Court has given scholars fresh reason
to carefully re-examine Effingham’s warning about the dangers posed by copyright
to free expression. First, by tying application of First Amendment scrutiny to a test
of whether Congress has altered the “traditional contours” of copyright law, the
Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft 7 gave the matter of copyright history First Amendment
importance. Second, despite longstanding claims 8 that copyright law and the First
Amendment did not conflict with one another due principally to copyright’s ideaexpression dichotomy and the doctrine of fair use, the Court in its 2011 Term
considered whether a provision of the U.S. Copyright Act should be struck down
because it violated the First Amendment’s protections of freedom of speech. 9
Thus, it appears, after decades of reluctance and much prodding by copyright

6

See supra note 4.
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
8
See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985)
(“In view of the First Amendment protections already embodied in the Copyright Act’s
distinction between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the
latitude for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use, we see no warrant for
expanding the doctrine of fair use to create what amounts to a public figure exception to
copyright.”).
9
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Golan v. Holder, No. 10-545 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2011).
Speaking of the law at issue in Golan, Anthony T. Falzone, the attorney for the professors and
composers challenging the law told the Justices at oral argument: “Section 514 did something
unprecedented in American copyright law. It took millions of works out of the public domain,
where they had remained for decades as the common property of all Americans. That violated
the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment.” In questioning Solicitor General Donald B.
Verrilli, Chief Justice John G. Roberts said: “General, there's something at least at an intuitive
level appealing about Mr. Falzone's First Amendment argument. One day I can perform
Shostakovich; Congress does something, the next day I can't. Doesn't that present a serious First
Amendment problem?” Id. at 38.
7
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scholars, 10 the federal courts are being dragged toward a realization that copyright
law is not “categorically immune from challenges under the First Amendment.” 11
In Golan, those challenging the Uruguay Round Agreements Act as a
violation of the First Amendment contended that “[h]istory and tradition tell a
different story” with respect to Congress’ removal of works from the public
domain than with the series of copyright term extensions culminating in the Sonny
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act that was challenged in Eldred.12 In
advancing their argument that “Section 514 privatized public speech rights,” 13 the
petitioners noted that the House of Lords in Donaldson “held the time limitations
in the Statute of Anne cut off any common law copyrights the stationers might
have held in published works.”14 The Government, meanwhile, argued that the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act did not alter the traditional contours of copyright
law, and thus no First Amendment scrutiny should be applied. 15 This argument
hinged in part on the contention that, when Congress passed the first Copyright Act
in 1790, it took many works out of the public domain and brought them within
copyright protection. 16 Hence the question in Donaldson—whether works could
have common law copyright protection even after statutory protection has
expired—remains relevant today.
This article contends that understanding the “traditional contours” 17 of
copyright law requires more than superficial references to modern fair use and the
idea-expression dichotomy. A careful reading of eighteenth-century sources

10

See, e.g., JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001) (arguing that copyright law
currently weighs too heavily in favor of owners and authors and against individuals); Neil
Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1
(2001); Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s First Amendment, 48 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1057 (2001);
Yochai Benkler, Free As the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of
the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999).
11
Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The Supreme Court in Eldred said the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit “spoke too broadly” in making this statement. Eldred,
537 U.S. at 221. Meanwhile, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit applied
intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment to the Uruguay Round Agreements Act but
ultimately concluded that the Act was constitutional. See Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th
Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S.Ct. 1600 (U.S. Mar. 7, 2011) (No. 10-545).
12
Brief for the Petitioners at 14, Golan v. Holder, No. 10-545, (U.S. June 14, 2011).
13
Id. at 18.
14
Id. at 27.
15
See Brief for the Respondents at 12, Golan v. Holder, No. 10-545, (U.S. Aug. 3, 2011).
16
Id. at 17-18.
17
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
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reveals concerns that copyright threatened the structure of mass public
communication that emerged after the system of licensing expired in the late
seventeenth century.
Although eighteenth-century political philosophers,
lawmakers, and jurists may not have had a modern conception of individual free
speech rights as they came to exist under the First Amendment, at least some of
those early policymakers and commentators did appreciate the value of
communication unfettered by public or private censorship and control. 18
In this article, the relationship between copyright and free speech is explored
through a re-examination of the Donaldson v. Beckett case. In Part I, the article
reviews what modern scholars already have said about Donaldson as it relates to
the eighteenth-century relationship between freedom of the press and copyright.
Parts II and III re-examine accounts, primarily in newspapers, of the Donaldson
decision in the House of Lords in 1774. The news accounts reveal some concern
for the implications the case would have on freedom of the press, a topic that
greatly affected the late eighteenth-century newspapers themselves. Based on a
close re-examination of contemporary accounts of Donaldson, Part IV presents
considerations for today’s federal judges when applying—as they may be asked to
do more frequently in light of Eldred and Golan—the “traditional contours” test
championed by Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion in Eldred. The article’s
conclusions are applicable to Golan and should be of relevance to future disputes
about copyright and free speech.
I
SCHOLARLY VIEWS ON DONALDSON V. BECKETT
Generally speaking, American scholars and jurists have exhibited a
relatively superficial and poor understanding of Donaldson v. Beckett. 19 Some of
these misperceptions are understandable in light of the confusion and errors found
in the supposedly authoritative eighteenth-century legal reports of Donaldson. In
the history of American perceptions of the debate over English common law
copyright, special mention must be given to James Madison’s The Federalist No.
43, first published in New York newspapers in early 1788.20 In No. 43, Madison
argued that the proposed federal government should have exclusive jurisdiction
over copyright law, a topic that most of the colonies already had addressed in their
own laws. In doing so, Madison wrote that the proposed Constitution’s Copyright

18

See infra notes 219-26 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
20
THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 268 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
19
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Clause21 created a federal government power that “will scarcely be questioned”
and that “[t]he copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to
be a right of common law.” 22
Written as it was in 1788, it is unclear whether The Federalist No. 43
accurately reflected all developments in English law up to that point, including the
decision in Donaldson 14 years earlier.23 However, even if Madison’s description
of the state of English common law would be considered mistaken today, it would
be difficult to fault him for restating the understanding of his time. Due to an error
in the reporting of advisory opinions by common law judges, 24 Madison and his
contemporaries understandably could have described Donaldson as holding that a
common law copyright did exist. It must also be recalled that Madison’s
Federalist No. 43 was a rhetorical and propaganda device to persuade colonists
that the proposed Constitution’s Copyright Clause was in line with their common
law history, and therefore it was in Madison’s interest to say that British common
law included copyright protection. 25 In addition, the 1783 edition of Blackstone’s
Commentaries, which would have contained a report of Donaldson, may not have
been available to colonial lawyers until after the Revolutionary War, and so
American colonists may have continued to apply the precedent of Millar v. Taylor
long after British judges had abandoned it in Donaldson.26

21

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.”
22
THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 20.
23
One scholar has pointed out that the colonists should have been aware of the British
literary property debate because on January 29, 1774, Benjamin Franklin appeared before
members of the House of Lords in the Privy Council and was dressed down by Solicitor General
Wedderburn. Just days later, Wedderburn would argue before the lords in favor of common law
copyright in Donaldson v. Beckett, and on this occasion Wedderburn pilloried Franklin for
having published a series of letters in a Boston newspaper without authorization of the letters’
owners. See Liam Séamus O’Melinn, What if James Madison Were to Assess the Intellectual
Property Revolution? 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 401, 403 (2008).
24
See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text for the observation that Burrows’ omission
of the speeches and votes of the lords contributed to misunderstandings of Donaldson’s holding.
It was the votes of the lords, not the common law judges, that decided the case, and the lords
clearly voted against the existence of a common law copyright. See infra notes 184-87 and 19193 and accompanying text for a fuller explication of Burrows’ miscounting of the votes of the
common law judges and the effects of that error.
25
See O’Melinn, supra note 23, at 408.
26
See Susan P. Liemer, How We Lost Our Moral Rights and the Door Closed on NonEconomic Values in Copyright, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 21-22 (2005). Another
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While Donaldson has been called a case in which there was an answer but
no rationale, 27 some modern scholars have argued that the real logic of the case
was that common law copyright did not exist. 28 If it is the case that Donaldson
stood for the fact that a common law copyright did not exist, then Madison—like
Burrow, the official case reporter—got it wrong. Madison’s mistaken belief was
then cited by the influential early U.S. Supreme Court case Wheaton v. Peters. 29
In the course of its opinion in Wheaton, the Supreme Court discussed
Donaldson but may have perpetuated several errors. In Wheaton, the Court had to
determine whether a common law copyright, if it existed in the United States, had
been violated, as well as whether a violation of the U.S. Copyright Act had
occurred, in an infringement claim involving the copying of its own reported
decisions. Having cited and relied exclusively on Burrow, which did not contain
the speeches of the lords, the Supreme Court mistook the advisory opinions of the
common law judges for the rationale of the case.30 Second, again relying on
Burrow, the Court was misled into thinking that six of the 11 advisory judges had
said the common law copyright was superseded by the Statute of Anne, 31 when in
fact six of the 11 judges (the difference being Nares, whose vote was misreported
in Burrow) had said the common law copyright was not superseded by the Statute
of Anne. Hence Wheaton mis-described the holding of Donaldson in a way that
would be followed many times subsequently by jurists and scholars. In the end,
Wheaton concluded that while there was a common law right of first publication,
there was not a perpetual common law copyright in the United States that would

author speculates that Madison, in The Federalist No. 43, “may have been misled because his
Blackstone was printed before the outcome of Donaldson v. Beckett.” Malla Pollack, Purveyance
and Power, or Over-Priced Free Lunch: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Ally of the
Takings Clause in the Public’s Control of Government, 30 SW. U. L. REV. 1, 110 n.659 (2000)
(citing John F. Whicher, The Ghost of Donaldson v. Beckett: An Inquiry into the Constitutional
Distribution of Powers over the Law of Literary Proptery in the United States, 9 BULL. COPYR.
SOC’Y OF U.S.A. 102, 133 (1961-62)) For the coverage of Donaldson in the 1783 edition of
Commentaries, see 2 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
407, note h (9th ed. 1783).
27
See ROSE, supra note 4, at 103.
28
See RONAN DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT TO COPY 191-210 (2004) [hereinafter
DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN]; RONAN DEAZLEY, RETHINKING COPYRIGHT 19-20 (hardcover ed.
2006) [hereinafter DEAZLEY, RETHINKING COPYRIGHT].
29
See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 681, 685 (1834).
30
See id. at 655-56 (“The eleven judges gave their opinions on the following points.”).
31
See id. at 656 (“It would appear from the points decided, that a majority of the judges were
in favour of the common law right of authors, but that the same had been taken away by the
statute.”).

2011]

CHOKING THE CHANNEL OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

87

continue to exist after publication; at the point of publication, the rights available
to an author were through the Copyright Act alone.32
The author and three graduate students reviewed all 271 journal and law
review articles in the U.S. version of Westlaw’s “Journals and Law Reviews”
database that cite Donaldson v. Beckett (or Becket, as the spelling is sometimes
rendered).33
The review demonstrated significant confusion in the legal
scholarship over the rationale and holding of Donaldson and showed that at least
some of this confusion comes from errors and omissions in the eighteenth-century
legal reports. Nearly 80 percent of the U.S. law review articles cite only to
Burrow, only to Brown, or to Burrow and Brown together. Although they are the
most common versions of Donaldson to be cited, Burrow and Brown are the least
comprehensive and least accurate of the five reported versions of the case. 34 It has
been well-documented by Abrams, 35 Deazley, 36 and Rose 37 that Burrow
perpetuated an error regarding the vote of a judge named Nares, and that has had a
significant impact on how the case has been perceived during more than 235 years.
Burrow does not include the speeches by the lords, and Brown does not
report the speeches by either the lords or the judges. Thus neither of them is
particularly useful in actually understanding the rationale of Donaldson. The fact
that Burrow reports the speeches by the judges but not the lords has contributed to
the tendency of some American scholars, accustomed to reading judicial rationales
in written opinions, to mistake the advisory opinions of the judges for the binding
logic of the lords, the ultimate decision-makers in the case.38 Only about 12
percent of American legal journal articles cite the Parliamentary History, the
Gentleman’s Report, or the Anonymous Report, even though those versions of the
32

See id. at 658-61.
See Appendix for a summary of the results of this review.
34
See supra note 4 for a description of the five legal reports.
35
See Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law: Exploding
the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1119, 1156-70 (1983).
36
See DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN, supra note 28, at 199; DEAZLEY, RETHINKING COPYRIGHT,
supra note 28, at 17-18.
37
See ROSE, supra note 4, at 154-58.
38
See Craig W. Dallon, The Problem With Congress and Copyright Law: Forgetting the Past
and Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 365, 414-15 (2004) (discussing how
the idiosyncratic nature of eighteenth-century House of Lords procedure has contributed to
modern confusion about the meaning of Donaldson). See also H. Ron Davidson, The Mechanics
of Judicial Vote Switching, 38 SUFFOLK L. REV. 17, 41 (2004). Abrams noted that the “dean of
American copyright scholars,” Melville Nimmer, initially made this error. See Abrams, supra
note 35, at 1164 n.189.
33
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case are more accurate and complete than either Burrow or Brown. Nearly 10
percent of the articles discussed Donaldson but cited no version of the actual case;
instead, these articles either cited no source or cited a secondary source, such as a
journal article or book, in referencing Donaldson (see Appendix).
Modern American legal scholars describe the holding of Donaldson v.
Beckett in three major ways (see Appendix). About a fifth of the articles said the
case held that no common law copyright existed at all. This is the meaning of
Donaldson that has been most recently advocated by experts who have closely
examined British copyright history, including the British scholar Ronan Deazley. 39
Meanwhile, another fifth of the articles focused their description of Donaldson on
the general idea that publication of a work cut off some form of common law right.
The third major description of the case by journal authors was that Donaldson held
or recognized that common law rights were superseded by the Statute of Anne;
some form of this description was present in nearly 30 percent of the articles. The
remaining articles either did not describe the holding or merely noted the confusion
surrounding Donaldson’s meaning. In summary, then, as many as half of
American law journal article authors seem to have misunderstood that the House of
Lords decided against the common law right.
Of course, there are notable exceptions to the general rule that American
scholars have struggled to understand Donaldson. For example, Mark Rose, an
English professor at the University of California at Santa Barbara, has written
extensively and perceptively about the history of copyright, and discussed the
importance of the Donaldson case for understanding British and American roots of
copyright law.40 Before Rose, Howard Abrams wrote that, had the U.S. Supreme
Court justices truly understood Donaldson v. Beckett at the time they decided
Wheaton in 1834, the path of American copyright law may have been altered
significantly. 41 And before Abrams, Lyman Ray Patterson conducted a
sophisticated review of copyright law history including Donaldson. 42
For the most part, however, these authors have not discussed Donaldson in
the context of what it offers for understanding the eighteenth-century view on the
relationship between freedom of the press and copyright. Rose, for example, only

39

See DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN, supra note 28, at 209-10; DEAZLEY, RETHINKING
COPYRIGHT, supra note 28.
40
See generally, ROSE, supra note 4.
41
See Abrams, supra note 35, at 1183-4.
42
See LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 172-79 (1st. ed.,
1968).
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briefly mentions Effingham’s speech in two sentences.43 Abrams gives similar
cursory treatment to the Effingham statement. 44 Deazley, though, noted Lord
Effingham Howard’s “fear . . . of unchecked political suppression” and also
pointed out that Effingham was not the first eighteenth-century English jurist to
express concern that copyright might interfere with public communication.45
Deazley noted that, in an earlier case brought against Donaldson by London
booksellers, Lord Chancellor Northington declined to extend an injunction against
Donaldson because, in his observation, a “perpetual property” in books “would
give [booksellers] not only a right to publish, but to suppress too,” and,
Northington said, “this would be a fatal consequence to the public.” 46
Many scholars have written well about the general relationship between
copyright and free speech.47 A smaller number of these analyses have cited
Donaldson in contribution to the historical understanding of that relationship, 48 but
very few American scholars have discussed Effingham’s speech specifically.
Among those that have done so, Diane Leenheer Zimmerman wrote that
Effingham voiced a “modern-sounding concern” about freedom of the press.49 In
another article, Zimmerman wrote that although the general understanding of
copyright law in the eighteenth century focused on societal goals and benefits
rather than individual rights, Effingham stood out for his effort in Donaldson to

43

See ROSE, supra note 4, at 86, 101-02.
See Abrams, supra note 35, at 1163-64.
45
DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN, supra note 28, at 208.
46
Id. at 172.
47
See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Review, Debunking Blackstonian Copyright, 118 Yale
L.J. 1126 (2009) (reviewing Neil Weinstock Netanel’s book, Copyright’s Paradox); Steven J.
Horowitz, A Free Speech Theory of Copyright, 2009 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 2 (2009); Raymond
Shih Ray Ku, F(r)ee Expression? Reconciling Copyright and the First Amendment, 57 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. 863 (2007); David McGowan, Why the First Amendment Cannot Dictate Copyright
Policy, 65 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 281 (2004); Peter K. Yu, The Escalating Copyright Wars, 32 Hofstra
L. Rev. 907 (2004).
48
See, e.g., Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Is There a Right to Have Something to Say? One
View of the Public Domain, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 297, 303 n.14, 314, 333 n.149 (2004); Michael
D. Birnhack, The Copyright Law and Free Speech Affair: Making-up and Breaking-up, 43 IDEA
233, 285 n.237 (2003). For a view on copyright and free speech in Great Britain, see generally
Michael D. Birnhack, Acknowledging the Conflict Between Copyright Law and Freedom of
Expression Under the Human Rights Act, 14(2) Ent. L. Rev. 24 (2003).
49
Diane L. Zimmerman, The Statute of Anne and Its Progeny: Variations Without a Theme,
47 Hous. L. Rev. 965, 979 (2010).
44
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champion the cause of individual rights in the face of a potential perpetual
copyright monopoly. 50
Mark Rose pointed out, in the context of a discussion about Eldred, that
Effingham and others in the eighteenth century recognized that “treating writing
simply as property,” rather than constitutionally protected expression, would lead
to the private control of printing through copyright law in much the same way the
government previously controlled printing through licensing.51 Effingham, Rose
said, urged “that affirmation of a common-law right of literary property could
provide a dangerous foundation for censorship.”52
Effingham’s hypothetical about a despotic prince or minister using copyright
law to suppress information contrary to his own interests “might appear somewhat
far-fetched at first glance,” 53 Zimmerman wrote, but in reality, Effingham proved
prescient. Zimmerman cited the examples of Howard Hughes, L. Ron Hubbard
and J.D. Salinger, who—while not exactly despotic ministers and princes—were
influential figures who attempted to use modern copyright law to suppress
undesirable information about themselves. 54 Queen Elizabeth II famously
extracted a front-page apology and a £200,000 charitable donation from Rupert
Murdoch’s Sun newspaper after she threatened to sue for copyright infringement
because the newspaper published the text of her Christmas Day 1992 address two
days early. 55 “Public pronouncements do not belong to anybody,” the newspaper’s
editor had complained futilely. 56 Indeed, in today’s world, “aggressive copyright
claims” may often succeed in silencing a political or commercial rival through the
use of preliminary injunctions even though a substantive infringement claim might
be weak. 57

50

See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Information As Speech, Information As Goods: Some
Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 665, 684 (1992).
51
Mark Rose, The Public Sphere and the Emergence of Copyright: Areopagitica, the
Stationers’ Company, and the Statute of Anne, 12 Tul. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 123, 141 (2009).
52
Id. at 141 n.82.
53
Zimmerman, supra note 50, at 684 n.134.
54
Id.
55
Richard Perez-Pena, Chronicle, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1993, at B7.
56
William E. Schmidt, Queen Seeks Damages From Paper Over a Speech, N.Y. Times, Feb.
3, 1993, at A3.
57
See generally, Alfred C. Yen, Essay, Eldred, the First Amendment, and Aggressive
Copyright Claims, 40 Hous. L. Rev. 673 (2003).
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II
ALEXANDER DONALDSON AND THE CRUSADE AGAINST SPEECH MONOPOLY
Alexander Donaldson’s background proves beneficial in explaining the
context in which he rose to prominence and became involved in not just one case,
but in a series of copyright litigation efforts. Even before Alexander Donaldson
was born, his grandfather experienced firsthand the perils of publishing a
newspaper without broad legal and societal free press guarantees. Capt. James
Donaldson already was a satirical poet and author of several pamphlets when, in
1699, he received permission from the Privy Council to begin publishing the
Edinburgh Gazette newspaper.58 He was briefly jailed at one point for publishing
false statements, but gained his release upon promising to allow the Privy Council
to censor his newspaper in the future. 59 Capt. James Donaldson’s grandson,
Alexander, entered the bookselling business in 1750, while still in his early
twenties.
With John Reid, Alexander Donaldson owned and operated a bookshop in
Edinburgh. He also ran a bookshop in London with his brother John, until their
partnership dissolved in 1773. 60 Donaldson forged a reputation, as a bookseller,
for selling cheap editions of books for which the statutory period of copyright had
expired. This made him the subject of both praise and criticism, and he was even
compared to Robin Hood for his efforts to disseminate previously copyrighted
information at low cost.61
Donaldson launched the Edinburgh Advertiser with Reid in 1764, and served
as editor and publisher of the newspaper until the beginning of 1774, when he
turned the operation over to his son, James. Donaldson’s launch of the Advertiser
was attributed to his public-spiritedness and enterprising nature, as he recognized a
commercial opportunity. 62 On the first page of the first edition, dated Tuesday,
January 3, 1764, Donaldson and Reid wrote that the Advertiser was intended to be
published on Tuesday and Friday to take advantage of the fact that no other
newspapers were printed in Edinburgh on these days, yet mail delivery arrived

58

ROBERT T. SKINNER, A NOTABLE FAMILY OF SCOTS PRINTERS 1-2 (1927).
Id. at 2.
60
Id. at 5.
61
1 JAMES BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON, LL.D., 237-38 (London, Baldwin,
1791).
62
SKINNER, supra note 58, at 16.
59
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from London on these days and so there was news to convey. 63 In stating their
purpose of publishing the newspaper, Donaldson and Reid wrote:
Beside what are properly called news, the editors will give the utmost
attention to whatever regards religion, trade, manufactures,
agriculture, and politics in Great Britain, and Ireland, and the colonies
thereto belonging; and will be careful to insert the best and most
accurate accounts they can procure of all important transactions,
interesting anecdotes, and useful discoveries, in every part of the
British dominions. Nor shall the article of Entertainment, for which
there is so large a demand, be unregarded. Essays on useful,
ingenious, and entertaining subjects, both in prose and verse, if well
wrote, and of moderate extent, will be thankfully received and readily
inserted. 64
On the first day of publication, Donaldson and Reid criticized the other
Edinburgh newspapers, all of whom refused to publish an advertisement
announcing the launch of the Advertiser. 65 Within two months, Donaldson and
Reid gave a lengthy invitation to and justification of advertising, saying that old
notions about the disreputable nature of having one’s personal or business name
appear in a public print should be discarded. 66 The editors defended the value of
the London Gazette, an official government newspaper, which may not have had
independent editorial copy but did, they said, communicate some news and
advertising to the public and also had spawned other, independent, newspapers
throughout Great Britain.67 The Advertiser was printed in quarto size, and, with an
index published every six months, could be bound and preserved, thus enhancing
its shelf life and value to readers and advertisers. Within six months after its first
publication date, the Advertiser was apparently financially stable and had been
received well throughout Scotland; in writing to thank his subscribers and

63

The Editors to the Public, EDINBURGH ADVERTISER, Jan. 3, 1764, at 1. Copies of the
Edinburgh Advertiser, which are not part of the Burney Collection and are thus not available
electronically, were examined by the author at the National Library of Scotland in Edinburgh and
the British Library in London (Newspaper Library Branch in Colindale). Typed transcriptions of
the Edinburgh Advertiser cited throughout this article are on file with the author.
64
Id.
65
A Card to the Publishers of the Edinburgh Newspapers, EDINBURGH ADVERTISER, Jan 3,
1764, at 6.
66
On the Benefit of Advertising, EDINBURGH ADVERTISER, Mar. 2, 1764, at 1.
67
Id.
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advertisers, Donaldson recommitted himself to “the utmost care . . . to insert the
best essays and most interesting articles of intelligence that may occur.” 68
In his public writings as editor of the Advertiser, at least, Donaldson’s
concern for profits eventually subsided in favor of a focus on editorial quality and
independence. By the end of 1764, Reid had left the Advertiser and Donaldson
remained alone as editor and proprietor. On the final day of 1771, he wrote a
remarkable letter to readers acknowledging that newspapers might make mistakes,
but asking readers to forgive them and warning government officials to refrain
from both censuring and censoring:
If we have occasionally married couples without the privity of friends
or relations, without the publication of banns, or even the consent of
the parties themselves, it can be no secret to our fair readers that
frequent examples of matrimony are absolutely necessary in this
licentious age. If we have sometimes dismissed people of quality from
the world, without asking leave of the college of physicians, the joy of
their friends will prove the greater when they are raised to life in the
succeeding paper. If we have been sometimes more in haste to decide
a cause than the lawyers themselves, we have thereby placed before
them an example, which all ranks of his Majesty’s subjects would
concur in recommending to their notice. In fine, if we have given
children to the barren, riches to the poor, or preferment to the
undeserving, we have only done that for them, which intrigue, chance,
or interest will frequently bring about; with this advantage in favour
of all parties, that the progeny we bestow will cost nothing in
education, the wealth we dispense may be retained without care, and
the honours we confer be received without disgrace to the donor. As
fickle as is fortune, we are favourable to all in their turn, and (as
Macheath says) the wretch of to day may be happy to morrow)—in the
EDINBURGH ADVERTISER. 69
Donaldson continued by writing that the Advertiser was “open to all parties
and influenced by none,” mentioning specifically that some had accused his
editorial approach of having been “too ministerial” while others charged him with
being too critical of British government ministers. 70

68

The Editors to the Public, EDINBURGH ADVERTISER, June 29, 1764, at 1.
To the Public, EDINBURGH ADVERTISER, Dec. 31, 1771, at 1 (emphasis in original).
70
Id.
69
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In 1764, Donaldson publicly distributed an essay uncovering the scheming
ways of London booksellers against Scottish booksellers like himself. Attached to
the essay, Donaldson also published the text of several letters from London
booksellers that exposed their schemes. 71 Letters by this time had been judged to
be the intellectual property of their authors, 72 and so this act by Donaldson both
provided the potential for a copyright infringement lawsuit and represented a
manifestation of his belief in freedom of the press from private control. Donaldson
was determined to invest in copyright litigation in order to protect future
bookselling opportunities, and he pursued litigation vigorously.
The Court of Session, Scotland’s highest court, decided in Donaldson’s
favor on July 28, 1773, in a copyright case brought by a London printer named
John Hinton.73 Hinton had sued Donaldson for copyright infringement after
Donaldson and other Scottish printers published approximately 10,000 copies of
Thomas Stackhouse’s A New History of the Holy Bible between the years 1760 and
1770. 74 The Scottish court held that there was no perpetual common law
copyright, or right of “literary property,” and that Donaldson had not infringed the
Statute of Anne because the statutory copyright term for Stackhouse’s work had
expired.75 Later, in the run-up to the House of Lords’ hearing in Donaldson v.
Beckett, Donaldson used his newspaper, as well as advertisements in other
newspapers, to publicize his victory over Hinton.
Donaldson paid for
advertisements in the classified ad section of London newspapers announcing that
he was selling copies of the Scottish Court of Session decision. 76

71

ALEXANDER DONALDSON, SOME THOUGHTS ON THE STATE OF LITERARY PROPERTY,
HUMBLY SUBMITTED TO THE CONSIDERATION OF THE PUBLIC 11-17 (London, Donaldson 1764).
72
See Mark Rose, The Author in Court: Pope v. Curll (1741), 21 Cultural Critique 197
(1992).
73
JAMES BOSWELL, THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF SESSION UPON THE QUESTION OF
LITERARY PROPERTY (Edinburgh, Boswell, 1774).
74
Id. at ii-iii.
75
Stackhouse’s Bible history was first published in England in 1738, and the statutory
copyright term under the 1710 Statute of Anne was 14 years, with a 14-year renewal term
possible if the author was still alive. Given that more than 28 years had passed between 1738 and
1767, the book had entered the public domain, or in other words was no longer under statutory
copyright protection, when Donaldson published his version of it.
76
Advertisement, GAZETTEER & NEW DAILY ADVERTISER (London), Jan. 27, 1774, at 1;
Advertisement, PUB. ADVERTISER (London), Jan. 27, 1774, at 1. Essentially the same
advertisement was published a few days later in St. James’ Chronicle or the British Evening
Post, the London Evening Post and the Morning Chronicle and London Advertiser. The London
booksellers did not like the fact that Donaldson had come from Edinburgh to London and opened
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Eleven of the twelve Court of Session judges 77 who gave their opinions in
Hinton favored Donaldson, and for several of them the only reason for pause was
an English Court of King’s Bench decision issued in 1769. In that case, Andrew
Millar sued Robert Taylor for publishing unauthorized copies of the poem The
Seasons by James Thomson.78 After hearing arguments on behalf of the
booksellers by the famous legal commentator William Blackstone, the Court of
King’s Bench relied on a series of licensing acts, the system of letters patent
granted by the Crown, the prerogatives and processes of the Stationers Company,
and several Chancery Court injunctions to conclude there was a common law right
of literary property. Lord Chief Justice Mansfield, a recognized authority with
whom even the Scottish Court of Session judges were loath to disagree, delivered
a shop that was focused on selling books at cheaper prices than what the London booksellers
could offer. Donaldson’s critics contended that his books were not only inexpensive in price but
also cheap in quality. A certain individual affiliated with or sympathetic to the booksellers (the
letter was signed simply “Aldus”) complained that Donaldson’s shop was advertised with a sign
that said, “The only shop for cheap books.” Letter to the Printer, MORNING CHRON. & LONDON
ADVERTISER, Feb. 15, 1774, at 2.
77
Boswell, supra note 73, at 37. Since the sixteenth century, the Scottish Court of Session
has acted as that country’s highest civil court, though appeals currently may be made to the
House of Lords or, since 2009, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. At the time of Hinton
v. Donaldson, as today, the judges of the Scottish Court of Session were legal professionals who
took honorary titles as “lords” upon their appointment to the court. See Court of Session—
Introduction, http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/session/index.asp (last visited Dec. 1, 2011).
78
Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201-02 (K.B.). Thomson was educated in Edinburgh
but moved to London in 1725 to serve as a tutor for a wealthy family while he pursued his
literary career. Thomson’s idea to write a poem about winter was not original; in fact, he told a
friend that he got the idea from another poet named Robert Riccaltoun (sometimes rendered
“Rickleton”). JAMES SAMBROOK, JAMES THOMSON 1700-1748: A LIFE 33 (1991). He sold the
copyright in the poem “Winter” to a young Scottish bookseller named John Millan (he had
changed his name from “Macmillan” to appear more English rather than Scottish) for three
pounds. Alan Dugald McKillop, ed., JAMES THOMSON (1700-1748): LETTERS AND DOCUMENTS
22, 37 (Alan Dugald McKillop ed., Univ. of Kansas Press, 1958). The poem “Winter” was
entered on the copyright registry at Stationers’ Hall in London on April 29, 1726. Id. at 64.
Thomson later wrote poems called “Summer” and “Autumn” and these copyrights, too, were
sold to Millan. Id. at 63-64. Millan assigned the copyrights in “Winter,” “”Summer” and
“Autumn” to Millar in June 1738. Id. at 120-122. The copyright for the poem “Spring,” however,
was sold to Andrew Millar in 1729. Id. at 69-70. “The Seasons,” a collection of the four poems
plus another called “A Hymn on the Seasons,” was first published in 1730 and subsequently
revised by Thomson numerous times and republished in various editions before his death in
1748. See HILBERT H. CAMPBELL, JAMES THOMSON 50-58 (1979). One critic said “The Seasons”
made Thomson “enormously famous” (though certainly not enormously wealthy) and “was
probably known, loved, and quoted more than any other English poem for a hundred years after
Thomson’s death….” Id. at 142.

96

N.Y.U. JOURNAL OF INTELL. PROP. & ENT. LAW

[Vol. 1:79

the holding that the common law right existed “before and independent of” the
Statute of Anne.79 Taylor was enjoined from printing or selling copies of The
Seasons.80
As with Millar v. Taylor, the case of Donaldson v. Beckett was brought by
London booksellers for unauthorized publication of Thomson’s The Seasons. 81 On
the same day Donaldson’s classified advertisement was published, one of the
newspapers in which it appeared also published in its editorial columns a report
that lawyers representing Donaldson before the House of Lords had requested the
beginning of arguments in the case be delayed a week until Friday, February 4,
1774. 82 Intended or not, the delay gave Donaldson the opportunity to print and
begin selling copies of the Scottish Court of Session decision in Hinton prior to the
House of Lords’ hearing. 83
The Public Advertiser, the newspaper that published both the classified
advertisement and the editorial report about Donaldson, had lifted its editorial copy
about the case verbatim from another London newspaper, the Morning Chronicle
and London Advertiser. In fact, much of the content of eighteenth-century London
newspapers consisted of passages reprinted from other newspapers, both foreign
and domestic. News content was expressly not protected by copyright under the
Statute of Anne, and the London newspapers reporting on the great eighteenthcentury literary property debate culminating with Donaldson v. Beckett borrowed
liberally from one another’s editorial columns. This tendency for newspapers to
print verbatim copies of others’ material—as well as the public anticipation for the
House of Lords’ consideration of Donaldson v. Beckett—was on clear display in
the first days of February, 1774, when at least three London newspapers said the
case “materially affects the Literature of this Country, as well as the Property of
many Individuals, to an immense amount.” 84 One newspaper, the Morning
Chronicle and London Advertiser, took such interest in the case that it printed
transcripts of the proceedings for nearly three weeks and, even before the

79

Millar, 98 Eng. Rep. at 252. Mansfield was a judge as well as a lord who would play a key
role in the House of Lords’ consideration of Donaldson in 1774. He previously served as counsel
for the booksellers.
80
Id. at 257.
81
(1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837-38 (H.L.).
82
London, PUB. ADVERTISER, Jan. 27, 1774, at 2.
83
DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN, supra note 28, at 194-95.
84
London, LONDON EVENING-POST, Feb. 1–3, 1774, at 3; London, MIDDLESEX J. & EVENING
ADVERTISER (London), Feb. 1–3, 1774, at 3; For the Morning Chronicle, MORNING CHRON. &
LONDON ADVERTISER, Feb. 2, 1774, at 4.
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arguments began, reproduced Lord Mansfield’s lengthy opinion given five years
earlier in Millar v. Taylor.85
III
DONALDSON V. BECKETT RE-EXAMINED
Given the importance of Donaldson v. Beckett as well as the
misunderstandings surrounding it, a detailed review of the facts and legal
arguments in the case seems to be in order. This is particularly so in light of the
importance placed on copyright history by the Supreme Court in Eldred and the
task before the Court in its 2011 Term case of Golan. This re-examination relies
heavily on contemporary newspaper accounts, a source not made the subject of
original examination by most copyright history scholars, with the exception of
Rose. Even Rose discussed only a small number of the scores of articles published
about the case in London and Edinburgh newspapers in January and February of
1774. The newspaper articles provide a particularly relevant accounting of the
case, given that Donaldson was a newspaper publisher and that they reveal the
newspapers’ own perspectives about freedom of the press in the first century after
the expiration of government licensing. 86 Furthermore, Donaldson v. Beckett
appears to have been one of the first judicial proceedings in the House of Lords
covered “gavel-to-gavel” by newspapers. 87 Before it came to the House of Lords,
85

For the Morning Chronicle, supra note 84.
Parliament allowed pre-publication licensing to expire in 1694. Among the immediate
results of this change in policy was the rise of newspapers in London. In the years leading up to
the 1710 Statute of Anne, however, public policy debates focused on whether and how to
regulate printing, including newspapers. See infra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
87
At this time, the newspapers themselves had just emerged from a significant free press
battle with Parliament over reporting and publishing verbatim the debates in the House of
Commons and the House of Lords. Via a Standing Order in 1698, the House of Lords made
unauthorized publication of its official activities a breach of privilege, and the Lords vigorously
sought to punish certain newspapers under this authority through the 1760s. William C. Lowe,
Peers and Printers: The Beginnings of Sustained Press Coverage of the House of Lords in the
1770s, 7:2 Parl. Hist. 241, 242-43 (1988). By 1771 the radical journalist and member of
Parliament John Wilkes, via the Printers’ Case, helped secure the right of printers to report
proceedings of the House of Commons. Id. at 244-45. To prevent a similar fate, the Lords
excluded everyone—including reporters and members of the House of Commons—from their
debates until 1774, when this practice eventually proved unsustainable. Id. at 248-49. While
news coverage eventually would change the entire culture of Parliament, in early 1774 the Lords
had not yet fully transformed their speeches into public performances for the benefit of the news
media and their audiences. See Jason Peacey, The Print Culture of Parliament, 1600-1800, 26:1
Parl. Hist. 1 (2007) (surveying the development of print coverage of Parliament through the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries); Christopher Reid, Whose Parliament? Political Oratory
86
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the case of Donaldson v. Beckett had been heard first in the Court of Chancery.
Upon initial filing of the case in 1771, a temporary injunction was granted, and the
injunction was made permanent in 1772 by Lord Chancellor Apsley, 88 another of
the law lords who, like Mansfield, would play a key and unexpected role in the
House of Lords’ later consideration of the case. Given that Thomson’s collection
of poems was first published in 1730, and that the Statute of Anne granted a 14year term with another 14-year renewal possible if the author was still alive,
statutory copyright protection had expired by 1768, when Donaldson printed the
copy of The Seasons at issue in Donaldson v. Beckett.89
Under its eighteenth-century rules, the House of Lords reviewed Apsley’s
decree de novo. As Lord Chancellor sitting in his role as Speaker of the House,
Apsley presided over the case but the ultimate decision rested with the entire
House of Lords,90 whose members were sometimes called “peers.” Those lords
who were not law-trained had equal say with those who were, but in practice the
lay lords deferred to the law lords on most cases. 91 In addition, the lords could—as
they did in Donaldson—request legal advice from common law judges via “writs
of assistance” on certain specific questions. 92 The role of the common law judges
from the courts of King’s Bench, Common Pleas and Exchequer 93—to give their
opinions on specific questions posed by the lords but not to decide the case
themselves—is critical and appears to be misunderstood by many modern
American legal commentators, who view the judges’ opinions as justifications by
the actual decision-makers rather than just advisory statements by external actors.
Copyright scholar Ronan Deazley expressed the relationship between the lords and
the judges on such occasions:
The lords, when faced with a particularly complex or difficult legal
issue, could call upon the common law judges to proffer expert advice
for the consideration of the House. The judges, if summoned, took up
their position upon the woolsack, a position that was not considered to
lie within the limits of the House. As a consequence, technically they

and Print Culture in the Later 18th Century, 9(2) Lang. & Lit. 122 (2000) (examining how a
parliamentary culture of “gentlemanly orality” began to give way under the increasing scrutiny
of print media).
88
DEAZLEY, RETHINKING COPYRIGHT, supra note 28, at 15-16.
89
See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
90
DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN, supra note 28, at 192.
91
Id. at 193.
92
Abrams, supra note 35, at 1157.
93
Id.
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“had no voice in the House” and could not give an opinion “unless
formally asked for”. When they were asked for an opinion, if
unanimous in their thinking, the senior judge present would deliver a
collegiate address. If, however, there existed disagreement then the
judges would be asked to answer the lords’ questions, each in turn, in
order of increasing seniority. 94
What follows is a daily summary of the appeal taken primarily from
contemporaneous newspaper accounts, with particular focus on aspects of the case
relating to press freedom.
A. Day 1: Friday, February 4, 1774
Prior to the House of Lords’ first day hearing the case on February 4, 1774,
London society had anticipated the outcome of the case with much anxiety. 95
Although it became clear in December 1772 that the House of Lords eventually
would hear the case, it was for about a year in the hands of a University of Oxford
law professor for “perusal and approbation.” 96 The Oxford professor apparently
was assigned as special master to determine the amount of money the petitioners
had derived from sales of copies of The Seasons and thus the amount they should
pay to the London bookseller Beckett.97
As the appeal in the House of Lords finally neared, London newspapers
diligently kept their readers abreast of “[t]he great cause of literary property.” 98 In
explaining its decision to reprint the lengthy Lord Mansfield opinion from Millar v.
Taylor in two parts, the Morning Chronicle and London Advertiser just two days
before the House of Lords took up Donaldson explained that “the public cannot be
94

DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN, supra note 28, at 193 (internal footnotes omitted).
In addition to the copious news coverage of the appeal in the House of Lords, the extent to
which the case attracted attention at the expense of other matters was evidenced by the fact that
the House of Lords postponed its consideration of what to do in response to the American
colonists’ Boston Tea Party, which had taken place in December 1773, until after Donaldson was
resolved. See London, LONDON EVENING-POST, Feb. 8–10, 1774, at 3 (“The papers relative to the
affairs at Boston, are preparing to be laid before a Great Assembly, that business being to come
on after the affair of literary property is determined.”).
96
DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN, supra note 28, at 194 n.22.
97
Donaldson v. Beckett, 1 Eng. Rep. 837, 839.
98
The newspapers even kept their readership informed of week-long delays in the House of
Lords. Postscript, LONDON CHRON., Jan. 22–25, 1774, at 8; London, MORNING CHRON. &
LONDON ADVERTISER, Jan. 25, 1774, at 2; London, MORNING POST & DAILY
ADVERTISER (London), Jan. 26, 1774, at 2; London, PUB. ADVERTISER (London), Jan. 27, 1774,
at 2.
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too well apprized [sic] of the peculiar nature of the question.” 99 The extent to
which the debate over common law copyright roiled and divided the English legal
community in the eighteenth century was evidenced by Mansfield’s statement,
reprinted in the newspaper during the days leading up to the House of Lords
hearing, that Millar v. Taylor was the first time the Court of King’s Bench had
failed to reach unanimity in his time there. 100
On the first day of the Donaldson appeal, a letter-to-the-editor writer called
“A Friend to Literature” anticipated some of the arguments that would be made
against common law copyright: The writer noted that London booksellers had been
paying authors for copyrights “from the day of Shakespeare to our times” and
therefore it was evident common law copyright existed long before Parliament
adopted the Statute of Anne in 1710. 101 Further, the writer said, literary property
may well have established a monopoly but no more so than any other form of
property ownership.102 The author said Donaldson and other Scottish booksellers
would never “give a shilling in their lives to the encouragement of literature” and
that “plunder, and temporary subsistence is all their aim.” 103 Finally, the letter
writer made an economic argument in favor of common law copyright, saying the
failure to enforce it would cause legitimate copyright owners and booksellers to
sell their works initially at exorbitant prices because of the expectation they would
thereafter be pirated. 104
A large crowd of people reportedly had to be turned away on the first day
due to lack of room in the House of Lords. 105 On that first day, the House of Lords
heard just one advocate: Edward Thurlow, 106 the Attorney General, arguing on
behalf of Donaldson. The newspapers described Thurlow’s remarks as “a long and

99

For the Morning Chronicle, supra note 84.
Id.
101
Letter to the Printer, On Literary Property, MORNING CHRON. & LONDON ADVERTISER,
Feb. 4, 1774, at 2.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
ROSE, supra note 4, at 96.
106
Thurlow was known as a “bold and determined lawyer.” 3 SIR LEWIS NAMIER AND JOHN
BROOKE, THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 1754-1790, 530 (Oxford Univ. Press 1964). Thurlow and two
of the lawyers who represented Beckett, the Solicitor General Alexander Wedderburn and John
Dunning, were veterans of literary property litigation, having appeared against one another in
1761 in a case called Tonson v. Collins, (1761) 96 Eng. Rep. 169 (K.B.), and again in 1768 in
Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B.). DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN, supra note 28, at
195.
100
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eloquent speech” 107 against literary property, or perpetual common law copyright,
in which he “declaimed against monopolies of that nature as repugnant to law.” 108
In February 1774, Thurlow was a 42-year-old lawyer on the ascendancy. He
and Dunning, despite their positions on opposite sides of the copyright litigation
and their sharp critiques of one another’s arguments, were known to be close
associates. Thurlow’s arguments before the House of Lords on behalf of
Donaldson were summarized in general form by Brown, together with and
undifferentiated from those of his co-counsel, Sir John Dalrymple. 109 Burrow
contains no report of Thurlow’s remarks or any others made by the lawyers in the
case.110 The Parliamentary History contains a third-person account of Thurlow’s
remarks, which were said to be focused on the nature of property and whether such
a thing as literary property could even exist or was “too abstruse and chimerical a
nature to be defined.” 111 Thurlow appealed to history, stating that if there had been
a common law or natural right, then royal “grants, charters, licenses, and patents”
would not have been necessary and neither would the Statute of Anne itself.112
The Anonymous Report contains a third-person account similar to that of the
Parliamentary History, 113 but the Gentleman’s Report conveys what purports to be
a first-person transcript of Thurlow’s remarks. 114
The newspapers focused on Thurlow’s discussion of previous Chancery
Court injunctions in favor of booksellers with respect to the unauthorized
publication of the anonymous seventeenth-century work “Whole Duty of Man” as
well as works by Milton, Pope, Swift and others.115 Thurlow argued these

107

London, GAZETTEER & NEW DAILY ADVERTISER (London), Feb. 5, 1774, at 2. Another
newspaper writer timed Thurlow’s remarks at two hours. House of Lords, ST. JAMES'S CHRON.
OR BRIT. EVENING-POST (London), Feb. 3–5, 1774, at 4. (The front page of the St. James’s
Chronicle erroneously displays the dates as Jan. 3–Feb. 5, 1774. The correct dates of coverage
by that issue are Feb. 3–5, 1774.)
108
London, LONDON EVENING-POST, Feb. 3–5, 1774, at 3.
109
Brown simply describes the appellants’ case as being presented by “E. Thurlow, J.
Dalrymple, A. Murphy.” Nowhere in the report are the respective arguments of the individual
counsel ascribed to them on an individual basis. See Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. at
839-46 (H.L.).
110
Donaldson v. Beckett, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 257 (K.B.).
111
17 Parl. Hist. Eng. (1774) 953, 954.
112
Id.
113
Anonymous Report, supra note 4, at 1.
114
Gentleman’s Report, supra note 4, at 5.
115
House of Lords, MIDDLESEX J. & EVENING ADVERTISER (London), February 3–5, 1774, at
4.
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injunctions were based not on a common law right of copyright but rather
government printing patents and the prerogatives of the Stationers’ Company. 116
The Edinburgh Advertiser reported that Thurlow had referred to the Scottish Court
of Session decision in Hinton v. Donaldson. 117
Thurlow’s arguments about the nature of property provoked strong
public response from a newspaper reader, whose letter to the editor the following
week expressed chagrin and surprise that the literary products of geniuses such as
Shakespeare, Milton, Bacon, Newton, Pope, Locke and Addison could not be
bequeathed to their posterity perpetually, but that other individuals could bequeath
such mundane property as a windmill, fish pond, coal pit or lead mine. 118 Other
letters-to-the-editor displayed similar sophistication in responding to Thurlow’s
arguments and those of Sir John Dalrymple, which would follow on Monday.
One, for example, evoked natural rights and a notion of the modern right of
integrity, 119 which predominates in European moral rights regimes and appears in
the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Rights. 120 Others

116

Id.
“The Attorney-General concluded, by hoping, ‘That as the Lords of Session in Scotland
had freed that country from a monopoly which took its rise from the chimerical idea of the
actuality of Literary Property, their Lordships, whom he addressed, would likewise, by a decree
of a similar nature, rescue the cause of Literature and Authorship from the hands of a few
monopolizing booksellers, in whom the perquisites of other men’s labours, the fruits of their
inventions, and result, of their ingenuity, were at present wholly centered.’ EDINBURGH
ADVERTISER, Feb. 8–11, 1774, at 3. In its reporting of this part of Thurlow’s speech, one London
newspaper emphasized the public interest. Quoting Thurlow, the Middlesex Journal and Evening
Advertiser wrote, “The Lords of Sessions[sic] in Scotland have freed their country from this
monopoly; they did it from the clearest conviction that it was contrary to the interest of the
public and of literature; and I cannot conclude myself with wishing, that your Lordships will also
free this country from the same monopoly.” House of Lords, supra note 115.
118
“Authors! Turn your Pens to Swords, or blunt them for the Service of the Law; what
Property you gain by [murdering] the human Species will be your’s [sic] and your Successor’s;
the immense Sums you may obtain by pleading for and against the Rights of others, the Law will
secure to you and Representatives to the End of Time! Strange must the Laws of that Country be,
where every Thing is protected but the Product of Genius!” Letter to the Printer, ST. JAMES'S
CHRON. OR BRIT. EVENING POST (London), February 8–10, 1774, at 1.
119
Some Thoughts on Literary Property, MORNING CHRON. & LONDON ADVERTISER, Feb. 9,
1774, at 2.
120
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 6bis, Sept. 9,
1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (revised in Paris July 24, 1971, and in 1979)
(“Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights, the
author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion,
117

2011]

CHOKING THE CHANNEL OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

103

expressed their support for copyright in terms of economic incentives to benefit the
public.121
B. Day 2: Monday, February 7, 1774
As with the remarks by Thurlow, the arguments made by Sir John
Dalrymple on behalf of Donaldson on February 7 were reported in brief summary
form by Brown and completely ignored by Burrow. The record that later appeared
in the Parliamentary History is very similar to a detailed third-person newspaper
account 122 published in the days immediately after the speech. Meanwhile,
another, less-detailed newspaper account 123 seems to have been the basis for the
version rendered in the Gentleman’s Report and a substantial part of the
Anonymous Report.
Dalrymple’s speech,124 though given little or no attention by Brown and
Burrow, is singularly important because it provides a window to understand the
contemporary view of the issue at stake in Donaldson, a topic of later confusion.
Several newspapers reported Dalrymple’s speech as emphasizing that “the point
principally to be contended” in the Donaldson case was that the common law had
never granted a property right to either bookseller or authors.125 On this point,
mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work,
which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.”).
121
A Thought on Literary Property, MORNING CHRON. & LONDON ADVERTISER Feb. 9, 1774,
at 2 (a letter writer stated that “an exclusive right to print a book must be legally vested
somewhere, otherwise the community cannot reap the benefit of it; for no man will be at the
expence [sic], risk and trouble of printing an impression of any book, if he is not certain that it is
not in the power of any other man to print an impression of the same book”).
122
The Substance of Sir John Dalrymple’s Arguments in the House of Lords Against Literary
Property, LONDON CHRON., Feb. 8–10, 1774, at 1 [hereinafter Substance]. Cf. Dalrymple’s
speech in Parliamentary History, 17 Eng. Parl. Hist. (1774) 957-63.
123
House of Lords, MIDDLESEX J. & EVENING ADVERTISER (London), Feb. 5–8, 1774, at 4.
124
Even before Dalrymple spoke, Woodfall’s Morning Chronicle predicted that Sir John
would give “an elaborate and learned speech.” London, MORNING CHRON. & LONDON
ADVERTISER, Feb. 7, 1774, at 3. In fact, Dalrymple’s time before the lords proved illuminating
and entertaining. One newspaper reporter said Dalrymple “seemed to exhaust, in this one speech,
all the knowledge, metaphysical, legal, chemical and political, he possesses.” Substance, supra
note 122. Newspapers also noted that Dalrymple recently had sold rights to his book “Memoirs
of Great Britain” to the very booksellers against whom he argued in the House of Lords. London,
PUB. ADVERTISER (London), Feb. 9, 1774, at 2. Following his speech, Dalrymple was called a
“pernicious bloodsucker of sleeping men” by one newspaper correspondent. London, MORNING
CHRON. & LONDON ADVERTISER, Feb. 11, 1774, at 2.
125
London, LONDON CHRON., Feb. 5–8, 1774, at 7; London, LONDON EVENING-POST, Feb. 5–
8, 1774, at 3; London, GAZETTEER & NEW DAILY ADVERTISER (London), Feb. 8, 1774, at 2.
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Dalrymple stated that the booksellers lobbied in favor of passage of the Statute of
Anne precisely because they knew they did not already have a common law
property right. It would have made no sense, Dalrymple said, for the booksellers
to have lobbied for a 14-year copyright in the Statute of Anne if they already
owned a perpetual right under the common law: “They knew their own situation,”
Sir John told the lords. “They knew the rottenness of their pretended right, and
wanted a new real one, instead of the old imaginary one.” 126 Dalrymple noted the
Statute of Anne said it “vested” or “secured” a right, and that language would not
have been present if the common law right already existed. 127
Dalrymple might have contributed to the confusion that surrounds
Donaldson—including on the part of the judges and the lords—and continues to
mystify legal scholars. 128 Although his main point of contention was that English
common law, like that of Scotland and every other “civilized nation . . . under the
canopy of heaven” 129 did not recognize a common law copyright, 130 Dalrymple
also made an alternative argument. Ideas, Dalrymple said, might belong to the
individual who has them as long as that individual keeps them secret. Once
published, however, those ideas no longer belong to that individual. 131 It was
perhaps from this line of argument—Dalrymple’s emphasis that the Statute of
Anne affected a sea change along with his discussion of the impact of publication
of ideas—that grew the sentiment that the real issue in Donaldson was not whether

126

House of Lords, supra note 123 (emphasis in original).
Id.
128
In general, Dalrymple’s argument is the least coherent but most entertaining of all the
lawyers who argued before the House of Lords. Dalrymple made a joke about not believing
anything said by the church; laughed at the attempts at writing poetry by British monarchy;
poked fun at the Stationers’ Company for its silly rules, including one about members taking off
their hats while speaking; and drew out an extended analogy to the Statute of Anne that involved
an imaginary Parliamentary act to encourage planting hedges and trees. 17 Parl. Hist. Eng.
(1774) at 959-62 (doubting the Church, mocking the poetry of British monarchy and the rules of
the Stationers’ Company); Gentleman’s Report, supra note 4 at 22 (the imaginary act to
encourage planting hedges and trees).
129
Substance, supra note 122.
130
That this was the main point of Dalrymple’s argument was recognized by the Morning
Chronicle, in an account presumably written by Woodfall, reporting that Dalrymple “entered into
a variety of observations upon the question at large” but ultimately “den[ied] that there ever were
any [rights] at Common Law upon such principles as the Respondents contended for.” Literary
Property, MORNING CHRON. & LONDON ADVERTISER, Feb. 8, 1774, at 2.
131
Substance, supra note 122.
127
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a common law right existed in England but rather whether the common law right
that surely existed was abrogated or preempted by publication of literary works. 132
The newspapers also reported that at least a portion of Dalrymple’s
argument centered on freedom of the press. According to William Woodfall’s
account in the Morning Chronicle, 133 Dalrymple “investigated the commencement
and the secrecy attending the commencement of the art of printing, as well as the
mode then taken by the printers to secure their property by patents, licenses, and
Star Chamber decrees.” 134 He observed that there was nothing so powerful in the
political process as the press and said that the British monarchy had realized this
early in the history of printing. The monarchy had to account for the fact that “free
use of the press must be finally dangerous to themselves” and so the Crown
colluded with the booksellers to create the system of licensing that prevailed until
1694. 135 In this way, he said, the Crown could exercise full control over the
content of mass communication, much as it had done in the previous century with
licensing.

132

See ROSE, supra note 4, at 109-10 (describing the possibility that Burrow’s errors
conveyed to readers the mistaken impression that the question being decided was only whether
the common law right is abrogated by statute, and not whether there was a common law right at
all).
133
Woodfall, editor of the Morning Chronicle and London Advertiser, created
“masterpieces” of detailed and accurate news coverage while other, less gifted reporters could
compose only “brief sketches” that sometimes suffered from errors and lacked detail. Peter D.G.
Thomas, The Beginning of Parliamentary Reporting in Newspapers, 1768-1774, 74(293) ENGL.
HIST. REV. 623, 636 (1959). Woodfall, whose nickname was “Memory,” possessed extraordinary
skills and capacity to recollect things that “enabled him to sit in the Gallery without moving for
twelve hours at a time, occasionally throughout the night, and then move on to his printing house
to compose a hasty record of the proceedings.” NEWSPAPER HISTORY: FROM THE SEVENTEENTH
CENTURY TO THE PRESENT DAY 160 (George Boyce, James Curran & Pauline Wingate eds.,
1978) [hereinafter NEWSPAPER HISTORY]. During the Donaldson case, a newspaper letter writer
who called himself or herself “Justice” commented on the “astonishing memory” of Woodfall
and noted that no other London newspaper even attempted to give verbatim accounts of the
speeches in the House of Lords as the Morning Chronicle did even though Woodfall never took
written notes. Letter to the Printer, MORNING CHRON. & LONDON ADVERTISER, Feb. 14, 1774, at
2. In parliamentary reporting, Woodfall was known to have acquired transcripts of politicians’
remarks and may even have been part of a common practice at the time of accepting money from
certain politicians to give them more lengthy coverage in the newspaper than that given to
political rivals. See NEWSPAPER HISTORY, supra, at 161. It is not known whether these practices
affected Woodfall’s coverage of the Donaldson case in the House of Lords.
134
Literary Property, supra note 130, at 2.
135
Id.
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C. Day 3: Tuesday, February 8, 1774
Solicitor General Alexander Wedderburn began presentation of the case for
perpetual common law copyright on February 8. 136 In his remarks, Wedderburn
appealed to both natural law and a public benefit rationale. 137 Wedderburn cited
the 17th century Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius, who quoted the Roman lawyer Paulus
in saying one who invented an object was the owner of it.138 Wedderburn showed
the lords a copy of the original grant by King James to the booksellers to print
some of his poems, with the suggestion being that James would not have attempted
to give the booksellers a literary property right he did not possess. 139
Later that day, the lords heard from John Dunning on behalf of the
booksellers. Dunning had served as solicitor general prior to Thurlow, and in 1768
Dunning had been elected to the House of Commons. Colleagues called him a
brilliant lawyer and “the foremost advocate of his day.” 140 Dunning was described
by the newspapers as “having a violent Cold upon him” 141 that caused him to be
hoarse and difficult to understand. 142 Dunning, apparently responding to
Dalrymple, said it was not reasonable to conclude that mere publication could
deprive a literary property owner of his or her right. 143
D. Day 4: Wednesday, February 9, 1774
On February 9, Thurlow was allowed one hour and 45 minutes to respond to
the arguments that had been made by Wedderburn and Dunning. 144 Following
Thurlow’s reply, Lord Chancellor Apsley directed that three questions be asked of
the common law judges, who would render advisory opinions to assist the lords in
deciding the case. Lord Camden then posed two additional questions to the judges.
These questions and the judges’ subsequent responses have spawned a great deal
of commentary and confusion. 145 There appears to be some dispute surrounding
136

London, PUB. ADVERTISER (London), Feb. 9, 1774, at 2.
17 Parl. Hist. Eng. (1774) 963-66.
138
Substance of the Arguments of the Solicitor General, in Favour of Literary Property, on
Tuesday Last, LONDON CHRON., supra note 122, at 5.
139
17 Parl. Hist. Eng. (1774) 965-66.
140
2 NAMIER & BROOKE, supra note 106, at 367.
141
London, supra note 136.
142
Literary Property, supra note 119, at 2.
143
Id.
144
London, GAZETTEER & NEW DAILY ADVERTISER (London), Feb. 11, 1774, at 2.
145
While the lords posed the questions to the judges in the form of whether the Statute of
Anne superseded the common law copyright, if it ever existed, the lords themselves were not
bound to answer those same five questions. The lords only had to decide whether the injunction
137
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even the newspapers’ contemporary reports of the questions. Woodfall’s Morning
Chronicle, for example, assured readers that all the other newspaper accounts of
the questions were in error and that only the Morning Chronicle’s reporting could
be trusted as accurate. 146
In fact, there are significant differences between the questions as rendered
by the Morning Chronicle, on the one hand, and three other newspapers, on the
other hand. According to the Morning Chronicle, Lord Chancellor Apsley
repeated his three questions to the judges twice:
1. Whether at Common Law, the author of any literary composition
had the sole first right of printing and publishing the same for sale,
and could bring an action against any person for publishing the
same without his consent.
2. If the author had such right originally, did the law take it away
upon his printing and publishing the said book or literary
composition, or might any person re-print and publish the said
literary composition for his own benefit, against the will of the
author.
3. If such action would have laid at Common Law, is the same taken
away by the Statute of Queen Ann? Or is an author precluded by
such statute from any remedy, except on the foundation of the said
statute? 147
Meanwhile, the London Evening Post rendered Apsley’s questions
differently, and two other publications 148 mimicked this version:
Question I. Whether the author of a book, or literary composition, has
a common law right to the sole and exclusive publication of such book
or literary composition?
banning Donaldson’s publication of The Seasons, in which the London booksellers claimed to
own copyright, should be reversed.
146
London, MORNING CHRON. & LONDON ADVERTISER, Feb. 11, 1774, at 2 (“The public may
depend upon our authority, when we assure them, that the questions stated by the Lord
Chancellor and Lord Camden, for the opinion of the Judges, respecting the existence of a
common law right as to Literary Property, are erroneously worded in every paper of yesterday
but the Morning Chronicle.”).
147
Literary Property, MORNING CHRON. & LONDON ADVERTISER, Feb. 10, 1774, at 2.
148
London, supra note 144, at 2; CRAFTSMAN OR SAY'S WEEKLY J. (London), Feb. 12, 1774,
at 3.
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Q. II. Whether an action for a violation of common law right will lie
against those persons who publish the book or literary composition of
an author without his consent?
Q. III. How far the statute of the 8th Queen Anne affects the
supposition of a common law right.149
The London Evening Post version omits the middle question about whether a
common law right, if one existed, was taken away upon printing and publication of
a work. In the London Evening Post’s rendering, the first two questions are
redundant and the third is less precise than in the report of the Morning Chronicle.
All of the legal reports—Brown, Burrow, Parliamentary History, Gentleman’s
Report and Anonymous Report—follow in substance the Morning Chronicle’s
account of the three questions posed by Lord Chancellor Apsley. But, as will be
seen, at least one of the judges apparently understood the question to be the one
printed in the London Evening Post and not the one in the Morning Chronicle.
Immediately after the three questions were put to the judges by Apsley, Lord
Camden posed two additional questions. Although Camden’s questions may seem
repetitive of those posed by Apsley, modern scholars have noted that Apsley’s
questions focused on the rights of authors while Camden’s questions focused on
the rights of booksellers or printers who purchased copyrights from authors.150
This is related to the fact that Camden’s questions refer both to assignees and to a
perpetual common law copyright that could, at least in theory, continue in force
even after statutory rights have expired. Once again, the Morning Chronicle
version of the questions was followed in substance by the five reported versions in
Brown, Burrow, Parliamentary History, Gentleman’s Report and Anonymous
Report (and this time, there was no significant difference in the other newspapers’
version):
1. Whether the author of any literary composition, or his assigns, had
the sole right of printing and publishing the same in perpetuity by
the Common Law?

149

House of Lords, LONDON EVENING-POST, Feb. 8–10, 1774, at 3. It is evident this version
makes the second half of Question No. 1 into Question No. 2 and omits the actual Question No.
2 (dealing with publication’s effect on a common law right) entirely.
150
DEAZLEY, RETHINKING COPYRIGHT, supra note 28, at 16 (citing PATTERSON, supra note
42, at 176-77).
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2. Whether this right is any ways impeached, restrained, or taken
away by the 8th of Queen Ann? 151
Although the judges would not begin giving their opinions on the questions
for nearly a week, it did not take that long for London citizens to begin chiming in
with their own answers to the questions posed by Apsley and Camden. Even
before the judges could begin to respond in the House of Lords on February 15, a
letter-writer called “Brecknock” wrote in the Morning Chronicle that the purpose
of the Statute of Anne was to encourage authors to publish their works as soon and
as often as possible within 14 years or the exclusive right to do so would be lost. 152
E. Days 5, 6 and 7: Tuesday, February 15, 1774; Thursday, February 17, 1774;
and Monday, February 21, 1774
A total of 11 judges, including two who were also members of the House of
Lords, gave their opinions on the five questions posed. Had they been unanimous,
the judges apparently would not have had to speak individually but rather could
have submitted a single recommendation to the lords. But since they disagreed, the
judges were given the opportunity by the lords to present their views in order from
junior to senior.153 The opinions of the judges have confused many readers of
151

Literary Property, supra note 147, at 2. The version of these two questions reported in
the London Evening Post and other newspapers differs in wording, though not obviously in
substance, from the Morning Chronicle report.
152
On Literary Property, MORNING CHRON. & LONDON ADVERTISER, supra note 76, at 1.
153
Literary Property, MORNING CHRON. & LONDON ADVERTISER, Feb. 16, 1774, at 2 (noting
that “the Judges were not entirely of the same opinion” and therefore the lords voted to invite the
judges to “deliver their sentiments upon the subject.”). On February 15, the following judges
were heard: Mr. Baron James Eyre of the Court of Exchequer, Mr. Justice George Nares of the
Court of Common Pleas, Mr. Justice William Ashurst of the Court of King’s Bench and Mr.
Justice William Blackstone of the Court of King’s Bench. Blackstone was indisposed (one
newspaper noted he was “ill with gout,” id.) and so he sent a written statement to be read by
Ashurst. London, LONDON EVENING-POST, Feb. 15–17, 1774, at 1. On February 17, the House of
Lords heard from Mr. Justice Edward Willes of the Court of King’s Bench, Sir Richard Aston of
the Court of King’s Bench, Baron George Perrott of the Exchequer, Baron Richard Adams of the
Exchequer and Mr. Justice Henry Gould of the Court of Common Pleas. London, GEN. EVENINGPOST (London), Feb. 15–17, 1774, at 1. Finally, on February 21, two judges who were also
members of the House of Lords spoke: Lord Chief Baron Sydney Smythe of the Exchequer and
Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas William De Grey. London, LONDON EVENING-POST,
Feb. 19–22, 1774, at 3. That Mansfield did not speak as a judge was a surprise. See London,
DAILY ADVERTISER, Feb. 18, 1774, at 1 (reporting that three lords were expected to speak on
Monday). He did not speak as a judge or a lord, thus drawing the wrath of his former clients, the
booksellers, who undoubtedly expected a repeat performance of his opinion in Millar v. Taylor.
The booksellers felt that Mansfield had induced them to bring the costly and difficult appeal to
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Donaldson for centuries, but in recent years scholars such as Deazley 154 have made
detailed efforts to document the judges’ views and to correct errors traditionally
made in describing those views, even in the official reported versions of the case.
The following summary of the judges’ advice to the lords, taken from
contemporary newspaper accounts, is organized around the questions the judges
had been asked to answer. It should be noted that not all of the judges explicitly
answered all of the questions put to them, and virtually none of the judges spoke at
length about the distinction between the questions posed by Apsley and those
posed by Camden. In other words, the judges generally did not distinguish
between the rights of authors and the rights of booksellers or printers.
1. Was there a common law copyright? (7 Judges “Yes”; 4 Judges “No”)
On this question the judges who answered “No” were Eyre, 155 Perrott,156
Adams 157 and De Grey. 158 Perrott and Adams (and probably De Grey) expressed
the sentiment that manuscripts could be owned in their physical form and that this
ownership would protect something like a right of first publication. This right was
not unique to expression but was a kind of possessory right of the type that would
extend to other property; as Perrott expressed, “[a]n author certainly had a right to
his manuscript; he might line his trunk with it; or he might print it.” 159 Perrott also
believed that “[i]f a manuscript was surreptitiously obtained, an action at Common
Law would certainly lie for the corporeal part of it, the paper.”160 This could not
be called a common law copyright, however. Instead, De Grey described it as
simply the power to do “what a man will with his own” and said it included the
prerogative “of publishing or withholding from the world a literary
composition.”161 Meanwhile, the seven judges who concluded there was a

the House of Lords and then abandoned them; in newspaper copy he was derided as mean,
treacherous and an imitator of Satan because he “tempted the booksellers, and now laughs at
them for their folly.” London, MIDDLESEX J. & EVENING ADVERTISER (London), Feb. 22–24,
1774, at 4.
154
See DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN, supra note 28, at 199-209.
155
Literary Property, LONDON CHRON., Feb. 15–17, 1774, at 5.
156
Literary Property, MORNING CHRON. & LONDON ADVERTISER, Feb. 19, 1774, at 2.
157
Literary Property, MORNING CHRON. & LONDON ADVERTISER, Feb. 21, 1774, at 3.
158
Literary Property, LONDON CHRON., Feb. 22–24, 1774, at 4.
159
Literary Property, supra note 156, at 2.
160
Id.
161
Literary Property, supra note 158.
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common law right were Nares,162 Ashurst, 163 Blackstone, 164 Willes,165 Aston,166
Gould167 and Smythe. 168
2. Was the common law copyright lost upon publication? (7 Judges “No”; 4
Judges N/A)
All seven judges who believed there was a common law right also believed
that it was not lost upon publication. However, none of the remaining four judges
clearly answered “Yes” to this question. Although all five of the case reports—
Burrow, Brown, Parliamentary History, Gentleman’s Report and Anonymous
Report—put Eyre in the camp of judges who answered in the affirmative, 169 a
newspaper account says Eyre argued “for an Hour and a Half, in a very strong
Manner against Literary Property” 170 and therefore, in his view, there was no
common law right for publication to take away. A careful review of the various
accounts of Eyre’s speech provides no basis for a conclusion that he answered in
the affirmative on this question. In fact, there seems to be widespread confusion
about what question Eyre was answering. 171
One contemporary newspaper writer reported that Eyre’s vote was given in
response to the second question as inaccurately described by the London Evening
Post (whether an action could lie) rather than the version of the Morning Chronicle
and the legal reporters (whether the right was lost upon publication). 172 The

162

Literary Property, supra note 153.
Id.
164
Id. Blackstone was known to be in support of the rights of authors and booksellers,
perhaps not coincidentally given his status as an author of the Commentaries, of which there
were known to be pirated copies printed in Ireland and Scotland and then brought to England.
Letter to the Printer, MORNING CHRON. & LONDON ADVERTISER, supra note 76.
165
Literary Property, MORNING CHRON. & LONDON ADVERTISER, Feb. 18, 1774, at 2.
166
Id.; Literary Property, supra note 156.
167
Literary Property, supra note 157.
168
Literary Property, supra note 158.
169
See DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN, supra note 28, at 199.
170
London, PUB. ADVERTISER (London), Feb. 16, 1774, at 2.
171
The second question posed a variety of problems and the reporting of the judges’ answers
to it seems full of error. Deazley, for example, notes an error in the reporting of Aston’s answer
to Question No. 2. See DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN, supra note 28, at 200. Deazley also reports
discrepancies in the reporting of responses to the second question by not only Aston but also
Perrott, Adams, Smythe and De Grey. See id. at 200-04.
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Literary Property, supra note 155 (quoting Eyre saying, “if the notion of a common law
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Gentleman’s Report,173 Anonymous Report 174 and Parliamentary History175 all
substantiate that Eyre said, in response to what he apparently thought was the
second question, that an action could not be brought because there was no common
law right. Thus it appears Eyre never squarely addressed the actual second
question posed by Apsley: whether any common law right that existed was lost on
publication. Burrow reports that Eyre said “if the author had such sole right of first
printing, the law did take away his right, upon his printing and publishing such
book or literary composition.” 176 But there is no basis for this conclusion by
Burrow in any of the narratives of Eyre’s arguments, including the newspaper
accounts. Given that Burrow made an error in recording Nares’ vote on the next
question, 177 it seems likely that Burrow’s statement about Eyre’s vote on this
question could also be erroneous.
A letter-writer to the Morning Chronicle challenged Eyre’s view that there
was no common law right. The writer contended that the real danger to the public
interest in free communication was that writers would not “bring the product of
their ideas to public market” but would rather keep them unpublished and thereby
monopolize those ideas. 178 This would happen, the writer said, if the statutory and
common law schemes for copyright were not sufficiently protective as to convince
the author that publication was in his or her best interest.
Like Eyre, the judges Perrott, Adams, and De Grey did not believe there was
a common law right and did not squarely address this question. To the extent they
believed a right was taken away by publication, it was the possessory right of first
publication and not the common law copyright, which for them did not exist.179
3. Did the Statute of Anne supersede the common law copyright? (6 Judges “No”;
1 Judge “Yes”; 4 Judges “If right had existed, it would have been superseded”)
On this question, six of the judges who believed that the common law
copyright existed answered “No” while only one judge, Gould, clearly answered

question: There being no common law right, an action could not be maintained against the republishers of an Author’s book or literary composition, without his consent.”).
173
See Gentleman’s Report, supra note 4, at 32.
174
See Anonymous Report, supra note 4, at 15.
175
17 Parl. Hist. Eng. (1774) 972-73.
176
Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 258 (K.B.).
177
See infra notes 184-88 and accompanying text.
178
Letter to the Printer, MORNING CHRON. & LONDON ADVERTISER, supra note 157, at 2.
179
Literary Property, supra note 156 (Barron Perrott); Literary Property, supra note 158
(Baron Adams and Chief Justice De Grey).
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“Yes.” 180 Although modern observers place Eyre in the affirmative camp, his
opinion might best be described as: “If a common law right had existed, it would
have been taken away by the statute” since he so strongly believed there was no
common law copyright at all. 181 De Grey’s opinion was similar, given that he
spent a considerable amount of time arguing that the Statute of Anne would have
superseded the common law right if it had existed but he also concluded the
common law copyright did not exist.182 Perrott and Adams expressed the same
sentiment. 183
Nares’ negative vote was erroneously recorded as “yes” by Burrow. 184 The
Parliamentary History is internally contradictory, reporting on the same page that
Nares voted both “yes” and “no” on this question. 185 However, it is of particular
importance to note that no fewer than seven London newspapers recorded Nares’
vote as negative.186 The importance of correctly placing Nares in the “no” group is
that Nares is the swing vote who gives the judges supporting a common law right
not superseded by the Statute of Anne the six votes necessary to constitute a
majority among the eleven judges who spoke.187 Given that the lords ultimately
did not follow the judges’ advice on this point (because they reversed the
injunction that had been given against Donaldson), it has been argued that the
lords’ holding against common law copyright is strengthened. 188 In other words, if
the lords had merely followed the advice of the judges, then the judges’ opinions
180

Literary Property, supra note 158.
Literary Property, supra note 155.
182
Literary Property, supra note 158.
183
Literary Property, supra note 156 (Baron Perrott); Literary Property, supra note 158
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Literary Property, supra note 155; LONDON EVENING-POST, Feb. 15—17, 1774, at 1;
Literary Property, MIDDLESEX J. & EVENING ADVERTISER (London), Feb. 15—17, 1774, at 2;
London, GAZETTEER & NEW DAILY ADVERTISER (London), Feb. 16, 1774, at 2; Literary
Property, MORNING CHRON. & LONDON ADVERTISER, Feb. 16, 1774, at 2; London, PUB.
ADVERTISER (London), Feb. 16, 1774, at 2; House of Lords, GEN. EVENING POST (London), Feb.
17—19, 1774, at 1.
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The erroneous recording of Nares’ vote remains somewhat mysterious as to its cause, but
modern scholars such as Whicher, Abrams and Rose have documented in detail the error and its
effects. Whicher, supra note 26, at 129-30; ABRAMS, supra note 35, at 1169; ROSE, supra note 4,
at 154-58.
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See, e.g., ROSE, supra note 4, at 157—58 (arguing that the clerk’s error was substantively
inconsequential because the House of Lords’ vote determined the outcome of the appeal but that
the error “contributed to a less than fully justified sense of closure to the literary-property
question.”).
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would have been most important. But since the lords rejected the advisory
opinions of a majority of the judges, it is the lords’ statements that must be given
priority.
4. Was there a perpetual common law copyright that authors could assign to
printers? (7 Judges “Yes”; 4 Judges “No”)
On this question the four judges who earlier stated there was no common
law copyright again answered “No,” and the same seven judges who endorsed the
common law copyright can probably be placed in the “Yes” category. For most of
these seven judges, the affirmative response is by implication because there was
little discussion, according to the newspaper accounts, of how this question and the
judges’ corresponding responses may have differed from the first question.189
5. Did the Statute of Anne supersede the perpetual and assignable common law
copyright? (6 Judges “No”; 1 Judge “Yes”; 4 Judges “If right had existed, it
would have been superseded”)
Unsurprisingly, on this question the six “No” votes came from the same
judges who answered “No” to the third question—those who believed that the
common law copyright did exist, was not surrendered upon publication, and was
not superseded by the Statute of Anne. And again, the only judge to clearly answer
“Yes” was Gould, while Eyre, Perrott, Adams and De Grey—the four who
believed no common law copyright ever existed—are probably best classified as
answering that the statute would have taken the common law right away if it had
existed. 190
In an effort to summarize the sentiments of the judges, Deazley has placed
them in three camps: (1) those who believed there was a perpetual common law
copyright that was neither abrogated by the Statute of Anne nor given up by
publication (Nares, Ashurst, Blackstone, Willes, Aston, and Smythe); (2) those
who believed there was a right of first printing that was not a common law
copyright but rather a kind of possessory right in the physical manuscript itself, but
that this right disappeared after publication because of the Statute of Anne (Eyre,
Perrott, Adams, and De Grey); and (3) one judge who believed there was a
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See, e.g., Literary Property, MORNING CHRON. & LONDON ADVERTISER, Feb. 16, 1774, at
2 (the opinions of the judges focus on whether there is a common law right of literary property,
and whether it is superseded by the Statute of Anne).
190
Literary Property, LONDON CHRON., Feb.15—17, 1774, at 5.
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common law copyright but that it was superseded by the Statute of Anne
(Gould). 191
However, based on review of the newspaper accounts, this article concludes
four categories of judges should be identified: (1) those who believed there was a
perpetual common law copyright that was neither abrogated by the Statute of Anne
nor given up by publication (Nares, Ashurst, Blackstone, Willes, Aston, and
Smythe); (2) those who believed there was a right of first printing that was not a
common law copyright but rather a kind of possessory right in the physical
manuscript itself, but that this right disappeared after publication (Perrott, Adams,
and De Grey); (3) those who believed there was not a common law copyright but
that, if one had existed, it would have been superseded by the Statute of Anne
(Eyre, Perrott, Adams, and De Grey); and (4) one judge who believed there was a
common law copyright but that it was superseded by the Statute of Anne (Gould).
The difference between this article’s categorization and Deazley’s is that, in this
version, Perrott, Adams and De Grey each have been placed in two separate
categories: one in favor of the possessory right of first publication and another for
the alternative holding that, if a common law right had existed, it would have been
superseded by the Statute of Anne. Meanwhile, based on a review of the
newspaper and other accounts showing Eyre did not vote “yes” on the real
Question No. 2 but rather answered a different question, Eyre has been moved
from the category of those who believed that publication resulted in loss of a
common law right. This seems to most accurately describe the four major ways of
thinking about the case among the judges.
Another way of viewing the opinions of the judges is that seven out of 11
(categories 1 and 4 above) concluded there was a common law copyright, and four
judges (categories 2 and 3 above) concluded there was no common law copyright.
Significantly, six of the 11 judges believed the common law copyright survived the
Statute of Anne, meaning that an author could assign rights to a printer in
perpetuity and the printer could prevent others from publishing the work even after
the statutory term of copyright protection had expired. 192 Given this state of affairs
at the conclusion of the judges’ advisory opinions, one does not blame supporters
of the booksellers for declaring in the newspapers that they were “well pleased that
the Question of Literary Property is likely to go in Favour of those who have in
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DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN, supra note 28, at 205.
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their Purchases treated it as such.” 193 In reality, however, the lords had something
else in mind.
It is significant to note, especially in light of how the case has come to be
perceived by American legal scholars, that only one judge—Gould—said there was
a common law copyright superseded by the Statute of Anne. Meanwhile, equally
significant in light of modern interpretations is that no judge concluded there was a
common law copyright given up by publication of the work in question.
F. Day 8: Tuesday, February 22, 1774
After following the case closely and reporting on its numerous developments
for more than two weeks, London newspapers were anxious for the decision by the
House of Lords. One newspaper reported that Lord Camden was “infirm” and yet
contended for more than two hours that there was no common law copyright.194
He took the booksellers to task, calling them “monopolizers of letters” and
“extinguishers of genius.”195 Camden agreed with Dalrymple’s argument and said
authors write for fame only and judges interpret law, not make it—essentially
concluding that no common law right existed. 196 Apsley then seconded Camden’s
motion to reverse the Chancery Court injunction Apsley had entered against
Donaldson less than two years earlier. 197 Apsley spent a considerable amount of
time speaking “against his own decree” and showing “the specious grounds which
he went upon before, and candidly confessed his conviction by a different opinion
from that he had before given.”198 Apsley claimed that he had been bound in the
Chancery Court to follow Millar but that he had no particular conviction in favor
of common law copyright and after examining the legislative history of the Statute
of Anne, thought it was clear that Parliament was against the common law right at
the time of passage of the Act. 199
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Lord Lyttleton said there was a common law copyright not superseded by
statute while the Bishop of Carlisle was reported to have agreed with Camden that
there was no common law right. Meanwhile, Lord Effingham said there was no
common law copyright because it would inhibit freedom of speech. 200 One
newspaper reported simply, “Lord Mansfield did not speak.”201 In summary, then,
four of the five lords who spoke were of a mind that there was no common law
copyright. The House of Lords ultimately voted to reverse the injunction, either by
voice vote or, in some accounts, a counted majority. 202 One newspaper reported
that “a great personage has expressed much satisfaction” at the decision but did not
say who that great personage might be. 203 One Londoner called Ben Button wrote
to the editor of the St. James Chronicle, “The Lord above knows but I don’t what
the Lords here below can mean by their Decision against Literary Property in
Perpetuity….” 204
Finally, the newspapers related two tragically humorous stories—perhaps
apocryphal—about the ramifications of the House of Lords decision. The first
involves a conversation between a bookseller and his lawyer, reported to have been
heard in the lobby of the House of Lords immediately after the decision in favor of
Donaldson:
“Bookseller. And now, Sir, I am ruined;—my whole Fortune has been
expended in Literary Moonshine.
“Lawyer. The more a Lunatic you, to lay out your Money upon a Nonentity, a Phantom,—to give a something for nothing.
“B. I thought it was Property; it was sold and conveyed to me as such;
it has been esteemed so for sixty Years past: The Author would have
libelled me if I had denied its being so; and I verily believed it was as
much Property as what I gave in Exchange for it.
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Literary Property, supra note 1.
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“L. And so it is; you see what it is to deal with an Author; you now
see your Money is no more your Property, than his Works which you
bought of him.
“B. This may be Sport to you; but it is hard to be ruined by a Decision
on a doubtful Point.
“L. Doubtful! The Law can never be doubtful; for every Peasant is
presumed to know the Law, and therefore you cannot plead ignorance
in Excuse for your Folly.
“B. Was it so clear, Mr. Double-Tongue, when the Judges were
divided in Opinion? [W]hen the Chancellor made the Decree which he
afterwards reversed? [W]hen the Lords themselves were not
unanimous? [W]hen--“L. Pfhaw, you know nothing of the Matter—this is the glorious
Uncertainty of the Law.
[Exit, chinking his Purse.
“BOOKSELLER folus.
“B. The glorious Uncertainty of the Law—that which has proved my
Ruin, and makes your Fortune—What shall I do? Shall I turn Pirate?
For they and the Smugglers are more encouraged than the fair Trader,
or Merchant—NO, I’ll turn Lawyer, there I cannot err, for the
Ignorance of Law, which has ruined me, is a good Plea in the
Professors; and my Friend’s glorious Uncertainty of the Law will
make my Opinion as often right as the best of them.” 205
The second story reportedly took place at Eton, and in it the teller notes the
anger of the booksellers toward Mansfield, who, had he spoken, might have been
able to change the outcome of the case:
An arch thing happened here a day or two ago, between a young lad
of this school and an old woman who sold gingerbread and cakes. The
young spark having made free with the dame’s gingerbread while the
old woman’s back was turned, and being discovered, was very
severely rated by her for making free with her property: the boy
observing that what he had taken was alphabet gingerbread, cried out,
205
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that she was mistaken, it was not her property, for the House of Lords
had lately determined there was no such thing as literary property, and
therefore lettered gingerbread was from thenceforth common. The old
dame was as angry at this speech, though she did not understand it, as
certain lawyers were at a great man’s silence on this subject, which
they did not understand, and determined to complain to the matter; but
a friend of mine, who saw the affair, stepped in and paid for the
gingerbread. 206
The newspapers also reported that “ill consequences” were expected to
result from the decision, and among those would be the discouragement of
literature.207 Donaldson’s EDINBURGH ADVERTISER, though, was ecstatic with the
outcome. Donaldson, who by then had given control of the newspaper over to his
son, probably did not have a direct hand in all the Advertiser’s coverage of the
case, and in any case the coverage was fairly objective. But at the conclusion of
the case, the ADVERTISER published a letter from London—one cannot help but
speculate whether it could have been written by Alexander Donaldson himself—
that made a concession to the joy of victory by publishing all the names of the
booksellers who had lost the case.208
CONCLUSION
This re-examination of Donaldson v. Beckett, and the discussion of modern
American scholars’ struggles to understand the meaning of the case, demonstrates
that determining the “traditional contours” of copyright law may be difficult. The
Supreme Court did not provide guidance in Eldred v. Ashcroft on how the
“traditional contours” of copyright may best be understood, and the issue is little
clearer today than it was in 2003. This article’s examination of Donaldson v.
Beckett has shown that, at the time of the adoption of the first American Copyright
Act by the U.S. Congress in 1790, the British House of Lords had made clear that
English common law did not recognize a common law copyright after expiration of
statutory rights. It is also apparent through careful re-examination of the case that,
while observers of and participants in eighteenth-century copyright legislation and
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litigation may not have shared a single clear understanding of Donaldson, the
potential conflict between copyright and free public communication was not only
recognized by newspaper readers, journalists, lawyers, judges and lords but at least
some of those involved were genuinely concerned about the negative impact of
copyright on freedom of the press.209
The lessons learned from this history 210 can be of use to federal judges in
reviewing free-speech-based challenges to copyright law. One such challenge was
heard by the Supreme Court in the 2011 Term in Golan v. Holder. The Tenth
Circuit addressed the First Amendment issue in the case, 211 and concluded that
Congress had altered the traditional contours of copyright in 1994 when it passed
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, a law that sought to bring the United States
in compliance with obligations under the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Rights.212 In bringing the works of certain foreign authors
from the public domain back into copyright protection, the Tenth Circuit said,
Congress triggered First Amendment scrutiny. One of the “traditional contours” of
copyright, the court said, “is the principle that once a work enters the public
domain, no individual—not even the creator—may copyright it.”213 Ultimately,
the Court of Appeals held that the law survived First Amendment scrutiny because
Congress demonstrated a substantial or important interest—to secure foreign
copyright protection for American authors under Berne by granting copyright
209

This fact does not mean that eighteenth-century participants in Donaldson contemplated
modern problems posed by copyright law in the face of constitutional free speech guarantees.
But it does counter the notion that copyright and free speech were never considered to be in
conflict and, therefore, under the traditionalist mode of constitutional and statutory interpretation,
American jurists in the twenty-first century should not apply First Amendment scrutiny to the
Copyright Act. See, e.g., Stephen M. McJohn, Eldred’s Aftermath: Tradition, the Copyright
Clause, and the Constitutionalization of Fair Use, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 95,
107 (2003) (explaining Eldred’s traditionalist focus on the First Amendment safeguards within
copyright itself); Michael D. Birnhack, Copyright Law and Free Speech After Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1275, 1278 (2003) (arguing that external constitutional scrutiny
must be applied to copyright because its internal accommodations for free speech are
insufficient).
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Of course, much more work can be done to understand the history of copyright and free
speech, both before and after Donaldson v. Beckett. This article has not made a comprehensive
attempt but only illustrates that the history is not as uncomplicatedly clear as some have
suggested. A primary contribution of this article is to demonstrate that copyright law and free
speech, while often considered completely separate branches of law, do have some shared
history that should be further explored.
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protection to foreign authors in the United States, even if their works were
previously in the public domain—which was unrelated to the suppression of free
expression and narrowly tailored.214
Upon appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the orchestra conductors, educators
and others challenging the law disagreed with the U.S. Solicitor General over what
constituted the “traditional contours” of copyright. The plaintiffs-appellants
argued before the Supreme Court on October 5, 2011 that the Tenth Circuit was
right when it said that a traditional contour of the U.S. Copyright Act was that
works could not be taken out of the public domain and put under copyright
protection.215 The United States, meanwhile, argued that First Amendment
scrutiny would be applicable only if Congress took the extreme measure of doing
away with fair use altogether, or abrogated the idea-expression dichotomy and
gave copyright protection to mere ideas.216 A substantial part of the written briefs
and oral argument in the case focused on the state of English and American
common law prior to 1790, when the United States adopted its first Copyright Act.
Those challenging the law contended that Congress did not bring any public
domain works into copyright protection in 1790 because common law copyright
already protected those works at the time. 217 The Government countered that
Congress did bring public domain works into copyright protection in 1790. 218 The
former interpretation is not supported by the evidence discussed in this article as
related to Donaldson v. Beckett, although admittedly this article makes no
definitive conclusions about the American circumstances and developments from
1774 to 1790.
What this article has shown is that the historical relationship between
copyright law and free speech is more complicated than a simple conclusion that
they have been separate branches of law between which lawmakers and jurists
have traditionally seen no conflict. In the episode of Donaldson, the conflict was
recognized and made up a substantive part of the debate. No one connected with
Donaldson viewed the free speech issues at stake in the way they would be viewed
today under the First Amendment, but nonetheless the concern that copyright could
inhibit communication of ideas and even the freedom of the press was present in
the speech of Effingham, as well as in the newspaper coverage. The newspapers
214
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themselves were just emerging from a bruising battle with the House of Commons
and the House of Lords over publication of those bodies’ proceedings, and several
newspaper reporters and correspondents recognized that the copyright monopoly
could pose a private threat to freedom of press similar to the state threat they knew
well. Further, newspaper coverage of speeches by Thurlow and Dalrymple
demonstrated that those lawyers made freedom of press issues a part of their
arguments to the House of Lords. Finally, Donaldson himself engaged in freepress advocacy through the editorial pages of his own newspaper, the Edinburgh
Advertiser, including during the appeal to the lords in Donaldson v. Beckett.
Perhaps one of the most important legacies of Donaldson should be the
recognition that, regardless of whether the common law copyright existed then or
exists today, and regardless of a statute’s effect on that common law right, there is
yet another source of law that trumps both common law and statute: a fundamental
human right to freedom of expression. Although their opinions have been given
relatively scant attention in the court of history, Effingham and the other lords who
spoke have given an important warning about the dangers posed by copyright to
public communication of ideas. Donaldson’s Edinburgh Advertiser reported:
LORD EFFINGHAM then rose and said, though it might appear
presumptuous in one of his cloth, (an officer) to give his opinion in a
cause which had divided the learned judges, yet he thought, if a
perpetual exclusive right was given to authors, it would also give them
a right of suppressing: a bad minister might purchase copies of books
or pamphlets, which arraigned his conduct, or were friendly to the
liberties of the people, and suppress them, and thus a blow might be
given to the constitution and liberty of the press; that where there was
a free press, there would always be a free people, and he wished to see
no encroachment made on it, or on the liberty of the subject, and was
therefore for reversing the decree.219
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Extract of a Letter from London, supra note 208 (emphasis in original). In response to
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In his eloquence and position, Effingham was not alone. Camden, too,
expressed a sentiment not far afield, and Camden’s statement has received more
attention from history than Effingham’s has. Camden said that science and
learning are public property and “they ought to be as free and general as Air or
Water.” 220 Indeed, Camden said, the very purpose of “enter[ing] into Society at
all” is to “enlighten one another’s Minds, and improve our Faculties, for the
common Welfare of the Species.” 221 Knowledge, he said, is of no use or
enjoyment unless it is shared, and true geniuses seek understanding rather than
money. 222 He cited the example of Milton, who, when offered five pounds for
Paradise Lost, “did not reject it, and commit his Poem to the Flames, nor did he
accept the miserable Pittance as the Reward for his labor; he knew that the real
price of his Work was Immortality, and that Posterity would pay it.” 223
If the alteration of historical contours of copyright law is really what triggers
First Amendment scrutiny, then courts in the future would do well to look carefully
at copyright’s past. Although it has been accepted that the modern American
concepts of fair use and idea-expression dichotomy account for free-expression
interests within copyright law itself, 224 the reality of copyright history is that it has
always had a more complicated relationship with free expression. The very
purpose of copyright law—to “encourage learning” in the words of the Statute of
Anne, or to “promote progress” of art in the words of the U.S. Constitution—arose
in the period immediately after Parliament allowed the Licensing Act to expire in
1694 and various parties clamored for a law regulating printing. As he argued
against a return of licensing, the journalist (later turned novelist) Daniel Defoe
articulated a societal benefit to freedom of speech:
To put a general stop to public Printing, would be a check to
Learning, a Prohibition of Knowledge, and make Instruction
Contraband: And as Printing has been own’d to be the most useful
Invention ever found out, in order to polish the Learned World, make
men Polite, and increase the Knowledge of Letters, and thereby all
useful Arts and Sciences; so the high Perfection of Human Knowledge
must be at a stand, Improvements stop, and the Knowledge of Letters
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decay in the Kingdom, if a general Interruption should be put to the
Press. 225
As an aside, Defoe argued later in the same essay that perhaps the
government could require authors to attach their names to their works and thus cut
down on undesirable attacks on others. This would have the incidental benefit, he
said, of decreasing “press-piracy,” or what we would today call copyright
infringement. In their efforts to get a bill regulating printing adopted and thus
restore their monopoly powers, the booksellers or stationers who had benefited
from licensing adopted Defoe’s public education rationale for free speech and
attached it to copyright law. 226 An understanding of the “traditional contours” of
copyright law, then, must take into account the intertwined histories of free
expression and copyright. Such an understanding will require much careful study
and will not be aided by simplistic or mistaken rhetoric based on a cursory
historical review.
Although the scope of this article has not permitted such a review of
hundreds of years of copyright history, it has demonstrated that, even if the
plaintiffs-appellants in Golan v. Holder are correct that American common law
protected works under copyright in 1790, this protection did not emanate from
English common law, at least in relation to Donaldson’s holding that there was no
perpetual common law right that continued after statutory rights were extinguished.
Perhaps more importantly, however, this article demonstrates that the
Government’s argument in Golan that Congress can remove works from the public
domain without First Amendment scrutiny is not in line with the outcome of the
eighteenth-century Battle of the Booksellers that culminated with Donaldson. That
episode suggests that legislative authority is not unlimited in the arena of copyright
law and legislative enactments of copyright are to be read narrowly while the
public interest, including in free communication, should be given weight when
considering copyright questions.
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DANIEL DEFOE, AN ESSAY ON REGULATION OF THE PRESS 3 (1704).
DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN, supra note 28, at 32.
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APPENDIX—SUMMARY OF DATA FROM WESTLAW “JOURNALS AND LAW
REVIEWS” DATABASE ON DONALDSON V. BECKETT
(1) Number of Journal and Law Review Articles Published by Year that Reference or
Discuss Donaldson v. Beckett
Year
1891
1902
1904
1905
1907
1914
1915
1919
1920
1922
1935
1945
1954
1956
1960
1965
1966
1967
1969
1972
1977
1983
1984
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997

Total
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
4
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
1
2
2
2
4
1
14
9
6
6
6
5
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1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Grand Total

6
1
11
9
16
23
19
16
12
19
13
21
16
2
271

(2) Citation or Citations Given for Donaldson
Anonymous
Brown
Brown Parliament
Burrow
Burrow Brown
Burrow Brown Parliament
Burrow Parliament
Burrow Parliament Anonymous Gentleman
None
Parliament
Parliament Anonymous
Other
Grand Total

1
81
4
120
12
4
15
1
12
7
1
13
271
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(3) Authors’ descriptions of holding in Donaldson (CL=common law copyright;
Anne=Statute of Anne)
CL given up by publication
CL given up by publication after Anne
CL superseded by Anne
CL, if it ever existed, given up by publication after Anne
CL, if it ever existed, superseded by Anne
No CL
None
Notes confusion surrounding Donaldson
CL existed in published works
other
Grand Total

20
38
71
4
7
54
51
13
2
11
271
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